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SLEC: A NOVEL SERVERLESS RFID AUTHENTICATION 
PROTOCOL BASED ON ELLIPTIC CURVE 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
ABSTRACT 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the leading technologies in the 
Internet of Things (IoT) to create an efficient and reliable system to securely identify 
objects in many environments such as business, health, and manufacturing areas. Since 
the RFID server, reader, and tag communicate via insecure channels, mutual 
authentication between the reader and the tag is necessary for secure communication. 
The central database server supports the authentication of the reader and the tag by 
storing and managing the network data. Recent lightweight RFID authentication 
protocols have been proposed to satisfy the security features of RFID communication. 
A serverless RFID system is a new promising solution to alternate the central database 
for mobile RFID models. In this model, the reader and the tag perform the mutual 
authentication without the support of the central database server. However, many 
security challenges arise from implementing the lightweight RFID authentication 
protocols in the serverless RFID network. We propose a new robust serverless RFID 
authentication protocol based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to prevent the 
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security attacks on the network and maintain the confidentiality and the privacy of the 
authentication messages and tag information and location. While most of the current 
protocols assume a secure channel in the setup phase to transmit the communication 
data, we consider in our protocol an insecure setup phase between the server, reader, 
and tag to ensure that the data can be renewed from any checkpoint server along with 
the route of the mobile RFID network. Thus, we implemented the elliptic curve 
cryptography in the setup phase (renewal phase) to transmit and store the data and the 
public key of the server to any reader or tag so that the latter can perform the mutual 
authentication successfully. The proposed model is compared under the classification of 
the serverless model in term of computation cost and security resistance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INRTODUCTION 
The wireless sensor network (WSN) has expanded recently to employ new 
technologies in the Internet of Things (IoT). The purpose of this evolution is to create a 
low-cost, reliable, and secure communication network for current and future applications 
using radio waves most conveniently. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a 
technology where the detection of the electromagnetic signals in the wireless sensor 
network identifies objects or people. Hundreds and thousands of RFID applications have 
been used to improve business efficiency and productivity in a variety of business 
operations, including supply chain management, access control limitation, product 
tracking, merchandise allocation, toll collection, and so on. It is also considered an 
integral part of daily life where its applications not only are limited to business activities, 
but also everyday life activities that are integrated into cell phones, household, 
automobile, etc. 
The primary system of RFID includes a receiver (reader), transponder (tag), and 
back-end database (server) to store and manage data. The RFID tag is a label that is 
placed into the object to be identified and located among hundreds and thousands of 
objects. It consists of a small antenna attached to a microchip with a small memory to 
store the object’s identity and data [1]. The RFID reader is a scanner placed in a fixed 
location to interrogate the tag whenever the tag exists in the scanning environment. The 
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Request 
Respond 
Database RFID Reader RFID Tags 
back-end database server operates as a data processor that manages, controls, and stores 
the data from the tag and reader. An RFID system is depicted in Figure 1.1 [2]. Since the 
communication channel between the reader and tag is assumed to be insecure, messages 
in RFID communication are transmitted in clear, and thus are vulnerable to security 
attacks such as replay attack, impersonation, traceability, man-in-the-middle, 
desynchronization, denial of service, cloning, and disclosure attack. A secure RFID 
system must be able to resist different types of attacks through maintaining system 
requirements of mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, 
forward and backward secrecy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Basic radio frequency identification (RFID) model [2] 
Since the RFID passive tag has limited resources to compute complex operations 
[3], the heavyweight protocols are not feasible for practical implementation [4]. On the 
other hand, lightweight and ultra-lightweight protocols use only simple operations within 
the tag computation limits and show the lowest tag computation overhead level, so they 
are mostly used in the current applications. Many RFID protocols are proposed to defend 
against different attacks. However, several vulnerabilities are detected in the lightweight 
protocols because it is easy to break out the security of their simple operations. 
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1.1 Research Problem and Scope 
The advanced development of RFID system leads to introducing the concept of 
serverless RFID where the communication between the RFID reader and tag does not 
involve a central database. This innovative scheme arises major security issues in the 
RFID system because both the reader and tags should form an autonomous 
communication. Multiple serverless RFID protocols are proposed using lightweight 
operations such as pseudo-random number generator and exclusive-OR operations [5]. 
Even though these protocols conform to the RFID passive tags limited resources, they are 
still exposed to security breach due to the lightweight operations used mainly in the 
reader and tag authentication. 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a public key scheme for low constrained 
devices that meet the requirements of the RFID tags. It can provide a security level that is 
similar to RSA with a smaller key size since their functions are easy to be calculated but 
hard to be factored back to the original values [6]. ECC is considered in the proposed 
SLEC protocol because it is feasible on the passive tag and provides higher security than 
other lightweight schemes. 
The basic idea behind the SLEC protocol is as follows. In the mobile RFID 
system, a reader and a tag start communicating by authenticating each other without a 
central database to perform the necessary calculations to establish a secure 
communication channel. In the authentication session, the reader and tag transmit 
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challenging messages that can only be computed and verified by a legitimate entity. The 
transmitted messages should be confidential, and they require encryption and decryption 
using secure and low-cost operations within the ability of the passive tag to process. The 
privacy of the tag is also needed to protect the tag secret information and location from 
being exposed to adversaries. Since the secure algorithms require extensive 
computations, it is essential to minimize the communication signals in the network, 
especially when the number of tags is high. We developed a secure and appropriate 
authentication algorithm that maintain the security of the system and privacy of the tags 
while minimizing the communication signals in the network to reduce the computation 
overhead on both the reader and the tag. The proposed protocol is compared with 
extensive simulations to demonstrate a secure mutual authentication over the currently 
available protocols. Also, analysis models are developed to validate the proposed 
solution. 
1.2 Motivation behind the Research  
Identifying products, humans, or information and authenticate their validity is a 
crucial matter, especially in mobile RFID systems where the readers and tags exit in a 
location away from the location of the central database server. In events such as the car 
dealership industry, a large number of cars needs to be identified and located off the 
dealership facilities and during the trips between departure and arrival destinations. 
Identifying asset starts by authenticating the real asset from a fake one along the 
transportation route. This is done using a secure authentication technique that can be done 
successfully by a legitimate and registered car. Tracking a car can use the owner’s 
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information to manage transportation securely to avoid stealing cars or losing routes to 
inventory locations. Authorized facilities must control access to the car's information by 
allowing only authorized personnel or users to access the car's information. The privacy 
of the owners is important, so any adversary should not be able to obtain any valuable 
information to the vehicles or their location. Privacy can be achieved by confusing the 
adversary by sending noise signals from different locations to avoid capturing the real 
information or positions of the assets and prevent tracing back the original signal by 
analyzing the network traffic. 
1.3 Potential Contributions of the Proposed Research 
Many of the current RFID authentication protocols are proposed to assume a 
secure setup between the server, the reader, and the tags attached to the cars, which is not 
realistic in most cases. In our work, we provide a secure setup phase that works as 
checkpoints through the transportation routes that the cars pass with along their routes to 
the destination. The setup phase updates the protocol with new values to perform the 
authentication of the assets. We mislead the adversary about the location of the asset, 
which will lead subsequently to the location of the source tag. The proposed SLEC 
protocol can handle a group of real and fake signals that are sent from a group of tags at 
the time to avoid tracing the actual signal. We also secure the asset information using 
keys that are known only to the reader and tag. The elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is 
used in both setup and authentication phases to secure the data forming a noval serverless 
system.  For the fairness of our comparison, we compare the authentication phase of the 
proposed model with other serverless protocols and ECC-based protocols to validate the 
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results of our work. Different analysis models are developed to prove the novelty of 
proposed work.  
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we present the existing authentication protocols in the literature, 
which mainly rely on the mutual authentication between the reader and tag in the RFID 
systems. A classification of these protocols and their analysis in term of security, 
computation, and communication cost is conducted. 
Since a passive tag is a tiny chip with scarce resources, it can do only low 
computations. Hence, RFID protocols are classified in this literature into four categories 
based on the complexity of the algorithm that is used to compute the tag responses: 
heavyweight, simple weight, lightweight, and ultra-lightweight [7]. Heavyweight 
algorithms use symmetric and public key cryptography that is beyond the scale of the 
passive tag ability to process. Simple-weight algorithms use hash functions that are also 
not feasible for passive tag resources. Lightweight algorithms use simple one-way hash 
functions, cyclic redundancy checks, and pseudo-random number generators [8]. Finally, 
ultra-lightweight algorithms use bitwise operations, which can be performed at low cost. 
2.1 Recent RFID Authentication Protocols 
2.1.1 Heavyweight Protocols 
Wang and Sarma [9] proposed two session-based authentication protocols, SB-A 
and SB-B, for reader–tag authentication based on symmetric key encryption to ensure 
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privacy and access control using two types of passive tags. The protocols are based on 
symmetric cryptography algorithm to provide low-cost authentication such as the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard (DES). Protocol 
SB-A in Figure 2.1 includes two processes. The first phase involves mutual authentication 
between server and tag according to the three-pass mutual authentication protocol 
according to the International Organization of Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission - ISO/IEC 9798-2 [10]. The second phase is for generating 
a session key between the reader and tag according to the Otway–Rees protocol and 
updating the pseudo-tag identity (PID). Protocol SB-B in Figure 2.2 uses tags with no 
memory or ID so that all of the tag’s information is stored in the server. A physical tag 
operation is mapped with the virtual digital tag in the server that can do all of the tag’s 
executions. The protocol uses tag nonce and counter control for synchronization, and not 
the server, because of the limited power of the tag. The protocols proved to be secure 
against major types of attacks; however, the protocols are considered to be heavyweight, 
since DES and AES are expensive operations that require a lot of computational 
overhead. 
For traceability issues in RFID, Ryu et al. [11] proposed elliptic curve 
cryptography-based untraceable authentication protocol (ECU) using the Schnorr 
signature scheme. The elliptic curve cryptography is considered to be public key 
cryptography for RFID systems with low constrained tags. It is used to solve the issues of 
three recent elliptic curve-based untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Strong 
Privacy-preserving Authentication protocol (SPA) [12], Efficient Mutual Authentication 
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Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
Step 4: Use PID to search the tag KTS 
 
Step 5:  
- Update PIDn to PIDn+1 
- Send EKTS(NT, NS, PIDn+1) to R → 
 
 
 
 
Step 9:  
- Verify reader authorization for OPR 
 
Step 10: 
- If OPR = read, send the message 
- If OPR = kill: 
• Send EKTS (NT, PIDn+1, RID) to R 
→ 
• Kill Vtag 
Step 1: Send RID, OPR to T → 
 
Step 3: Send PIDn, NT to S ← 
 
 
 
Step 6: Send EKTS(NS, NT, PIDn+1) to T → 
 
 
 
Step 8:  
- Send EKTS (NS, NT, RID, OPR), PIDn to S ← 
- Send RID, OPR, NR to S ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 11: Send EKTS (NT, PIDn+1, RID) to T → 
 
Step 2: Send PIDn and nonce NT to R ← 
 
 
 
 
Step 7:  
- Verify NT to authenticate S 
- Send EKTS (NS, NT, RID, OPR), PIDn to R 
← 
- If OPR is not (kill), update PIDn to PIDn+1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Retrieve NT, PIDn+1, RID 
- Verify RID = RID in step1 
- Check on-tag counter with time limit 
- Perform physical kill operation 
KRS: server/reader shared key; KTS: server/tag shared key; KRT: reader/tag shared key; NT: nonce generated by tag; NR: nonce generated 
by reader; NS: nonce generated by server; RID: reader ID; OPR: operation of reader; PIDn: pseudo-ID of tag in current session; EK(M): 
message encrypted by key K; Vtag: virtual tag in the server. 
Figure 2.2: Session-based authentication protocol (SB-B) by Wang and Sarma 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
Step 4: Use PID to search the tag KTS 
Step 5: Send EKTS (NT, NS, PIDn) to R → 
 
 
 
 
Step 9:  
- Verify OPR 
- Generate KRT  
- Update PIDn to PIDn+1 
Step 10:  
Send to R 
- EKRS (NR, PIDn, RID, OPR, KRT) → 
- EKTS (NT, PIDn+1, RID, OPR, KRT) → 
Step 1: Send RID, OPR to T → 
 
Step 3: Send PIDn, NT to server ← 
 
 
Step 6: Send EKTS (NT, NS, PIDn) to T → 
 
Step 8: Send to server ← 
- EKTS (NS, NT), PIDn 
- RID, OPR, NR 
 
 
Step 11:  
- Retrieve KRT 
- Send EKTS (NT, PIDn+1, RID, OPR, KRT) → 
- If OPR is (write), encrypt info with KRT and 
send it to T → 
Step 2: Send PIDn and nonce NT to R ← 
 
 
 
 
Step 7:  
- Verify NT to authenticate S 
- Send EKTS (NS, NT), PIDn to R ← 
 
 
Step 12: 
- Retrieve KRT, PIDn+1, RID, OPR 
- Verify OPR = OPR in Step1 
- Check the on-tag counter 
- Decode OPR and execute it 
- Update PIDn to PIDn+1 
- If OPR is (read), encrypt info with KRT 
and send it to reader ← 
KRS: server/reader shared key; KTS: server/tag shared key; KRT: reader/tag shared key; NT: nonce generated by 
tag; NR: nonce generated by reader; NS: nonce generated by server; RID: reader ID; OPR: operation of reader; 
PIDn: pseudo-ID of tag in current session; EK(M): message encrypted by key K. 
Figure 2.1: Session-based authentication protocol (SB-A) by Wang and Sarma 
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protocol EMA [6], and ECC-based authentication protocol PII [13]. Ryu’s protocol 
generates a digital signature with an appendix on the binary message of arbitrary length, 
and requires a cryptographic hash function, as shown in Figure 2.3. The sender’s session 
key is combined with the receiver’s public key to provide privacy, in which the message 
can be verified by only the receiver’s private key. Ryu’s protocol is secure against replay 
attacks, impersonate attacks, traceability attacks, and it maintains forward security. It 
requires two scalar multiplications, two hash functions, a message total size of 544 bits, 
and two communications between tag and reader. Even though this protocol requires 
complex computations associated with scalar multiplications and a hash function, it does 
not authenticate the reader. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
Setup Phase: 
- Generate elliptic group G of prime 
order q. 
- Choose generator P of group G. 
- Server private/public keys (y, Y = yP) 
- Store tag verifier X = xP (public key) 
 
Authentication Phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: Send random c to T → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: To authenticate tag 
- Compute R’ = y−1 Z 
- Derive X’ = eid ⊕ H (R’, s) 
- Check X’ = X registered verifier 
- Compute v’ = H (R’, c) 
- Authenticate the tag as H(sP − v’ X, c) = v’ 
Store x, X, Y (server public key) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Pick r as session secret 
- R = rP 
- v = H (R, c) 
- schnorr sign Z = rY, s = r + x * v 
- Encrypted verifier eid = X ⊕ H (R,s) 
- Send (eid, Z, s) to R ← 
 
 
 
 
G: Cyclic additive group; P: Generator of group G; q: Order of group G; xi: Tag’s private key; ⊕ XOR; Xi: Tag’s public key; y: 
Server’s private; Y: Server’s public; H: Hash function. 
Figure 2.3: Elliptic curve cryptography-based untraceable authentication protocol (ECU) by Ryu 
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To reduce the tag’s overhead in heavyweight protocols, Yao et al. [14] introduced 
The Reviving-UNder-DoS (RUND) authentication protocol to defend against denial of 
service (DoS) and preserve user privacy by powering up the tag to do complex computing 
for symmetric and public key cryptography. It leverages the power in DoS scans to 
enable the tag to respond in two ways: either using simple encryption when low signals 
from a reader activate the tag, or using public key encryption (higher security) when the 
backscattered signals are high in an insecure environment. The more signals there are in 
communication, the more power charges the tag. The option of using public key 
encryption in RUND protocol is to overcome the problem of breaking up the 
synchronization state between the reader and tag in symmetric key encryption. The 
protocol is secure because secret information is not sent in the clear, so no useful 
information can be gained if any message is compromised. Moreover, the parameters 
used in communication are changed and updated in every session, as shown in Figure 2.4, 
to prevent replay attacks, maintain forward security, and resist tracking. Even though the 
overall efficiency of RUND is O(1), it is still not compliant with the Electronic Product 
Code Class1 Generation2 (EPC C1 G2) standard [3], which is defined by EPCGlobal Inc. 
for RFID data communication. 
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Server: S Reader R: PUR, PRR, shared Ki Tag T: PUR, shared Ki, ID 
Initialization Phase: 
 
 
Mutual Authentication 
Phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Updating Phase: 
Step 1: Precompute and store in S: f(Ki, c, pad1) ← 
Where pad is padding length for f() 
 
Step 2: Send power waves last for Tpw with energy Ec. 
Send PRN r1 in l length to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: If response with symmetric: 
- Check counter c and search database for f(K’, c’, pad1) ← 
- Check r1 for replayed msg. 
- If matches: tag is authenticated. 
If response with public key: 
- Check and search database for (ID, K) pair ← 
- Check r1, r2 for replayed msg. 
- If matches: tag is authenticated 
 
Step 6: Generate r3 and compute I3 = r3||f(K, r3||I1, pad1) 
- Send I3, r3 to tag → 
- Update K = f(K, r3, pad1) 
- Update precomputed f(Ki, c, pad1) with updated key. 
- Preserve old key of tag. 
- Counter c is set to 0. 
 
 
 
Step3: Compute: 
If Ec energy: 
- I1 = f(K, c, pad1) 
- I2 = r1||f(K, r1||I1, pad1) 
- I = I1||I2 
- Update c = c + 1 
- Energy consumed Esk 
If Epk energy: 
- E(PUR, K, r1||r2, ID, c) in l length 
- Energy consumed Epk 
Step4: Send I to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 7: Check I3 using r3 by computing 
I’3 
- If matches: reader is authenticated. 
- Update K = f(K, r3, pad1) 
- C = 0 
PUR: Public key of reader; ID: Tag’s ID; Ki: Shared symmetric key; c: Counter for current key lifecycle; PRR: Private key of 
reader; padi: Padding for f(); Ec: The initial power the tag is charged; TPW: Time for the power waves to last; ESK: Energy 
consumption for hash function; EPK: Energy consumption for public key. 
Figure 2.4: The reviving-under-denial of service authentication protocol (RUND) by Yao 
2.1.2 Simple Weight Protocols 
To better improve the performance of RFID protocols and reduce the power that 
is needed for complex operations in ECC-based protocols, Farash [15] proposed a mutual 
authentication protocol (IECC) based on the elliptic curve. The protocol enhances Chou’s 
authentication protocol (EMA) [6], which does not fulfill the security requirement of 
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forward security, mutual authentication, tag privacy, and security against location 
tracking, impersonating attacks, and tag cloning attack for an RFID system. The main 
idea behind the protocol is to use the server’s public key to create the authentication 
message to avoid breaking the system privacy, as depicted in Figure 2.5. The IECC 
protocol is secure against major attacks, even though the computation cost is the same as 
in Chou’s protocol that needs to be reduced for practical implementation. 
Server S: {Xi, yP, P} Reader R Tag T: {Xi, Y, P} 
Setup phase: 
- Generate an elliptic group G of prime order q 
- Choose generator P of group G 
- Choose random no. y as a private key 
- Public key Y = yP 
- Choose random X from G as tag identifier 
- Store Xi, Y, P in each tag. 
Authentication phase: 
Step 1: 
- Choose a prime random no. r 
- Compute C0 = rP 
- Send C0 to tags → 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Obtain K’ = y−1C1 
- Obtain Xi’ = C2 – h(C0, C1, K’) 
- Find a match for Xi’ in DB 
- If found: C3 = h(Xi’, K’) and tag authenticated 
- Send C3 to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Choose a prime random no. k 
- K = kP 
- C1 = kY 
- C2 = Xi + h(C0, C1, K) 
- Send C1, C2 to server → 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Validate C3 = (Xi, K) 
- Server is authenticated 
G: A additive group of prime order q; P: Generator of group G; h: One-way hash function; y: Server’s private; Y: Server’s public; 
Xi: Identifier of ith tag which is a random point in G. 
Figure 2.5: Mutual authentication-based on elliptic curve cryptography (IECC) by Farash 
Zhang and Qi [16] also proposed another protocol (EECC) to withstand the 
security weaknesses of Chou’s protocol, EMA [6]. EECC protocol enhances patient 
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medication safety by also using elliptic curve cryptography. In comparison to the EMA 
protocol, EECC protocol resulted in better performance and security resistance to 
impersonate and forward security attacks. However, Baashirah et al. [17] found that 
Zhang and Qi protocol is vulnerable to forward traceability and reader impersonate attack 
since an adversary can compromise the private key of the reader by obtaining the tag’s 
secret identifier. 
Baashirah et al. improved Zhang and Qi protocol and proposed HBEC protocol 
that is based on securing the tag’s secret identifier using a one-way hash function. HBEC 
protocol overcomes the security flaws in EECC protocol to provide high security even 
though the extra hash function adds more overhead to the computation, which should be 
addressed for the network scalability. 
B.Chen [18] proposed a role-based access control (RBAC) protocol for mobile 
RFID to enable user privacy, role, and access control through the back-end server based 
on a certification mechanism. RBAC assigns role classes as keys to control the 
information and the number of times each reader can read a tag. RBAC authorizes 
readers, assigns role classes to control the reader’s authority to request tag information, 
and updates timestamps using random numbers and different shared keys between the 
database server and reader and tag ad, as depicted in Figure 2.6. Traceability and replay 
attacks are prevented using updated random numbers in every session; access control is 
provided using shared keys to prevent unauthorized readers from requesting or reading 
any tag’s information, and integrity is ensured using timestamps. However, RBAC uses 
one encryption mechanism that is excessive for low-cost passive tags. 
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The dispersion spectrum of the conventional single-mode silica fiber has a 
minimum at 1300 nm region. An increase in the signal attenuation and dispersion will 
cause a decrease in the fiber length. So at some points in an optical fiber communication 
link, the optical signal will be regenerated. 
Server: kx, ky keys Reader: ky keys Tag: kx keys 
1- Reader Authorization and role class: 
 
 
 
 
 
- Request role-class command, read tag 
command, TID, and RID from RBAC 
- RBAC sends role-class. 
- M3 = Eky(RID, r1, TS1, CertR, role-class) 
- M4 = Ekx(TID, r2, TS1, role-class) 
- Send M3, M4 to reader → 
 
 
 
 
 
2- Assign No. of reads and update 
timestamps: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 7: Retrieve CertR, r2 from M7 
- If CertR is verified, retrieve TS2, TCn−1 
from M6. 
- M8 = Eky(TS2, TCn−1, r2) 
- Send M8 to reader → 
Step 1: Reader sends Hello to tag →  
 
 
- Create random no. r2. 
- M2 = Eky (M1, r2, RID, Command) 
 
Step 3: Send M2 to server ← 
 
 
 
 
Step 4:  
- Retrieve r1, TS1, CertR, role-class 
from M3. 
- M5 = H(TS1 ⊕ r2) 
- Send M4, M5 to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6:  
- Receive M6 
- M7 = Eky(CertR, r2, M6) 
- Send M7 to database server ←  
 
 
 
Step 8:  
- Retrieve TS2, TCn−1, r2 from M8 
- Verify r2  
- Create random no. r1 
- M1 = Ekx (TID, TS, r1) 
 
Step 2: Sends M1 to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: Verify M5 using TS1 from M4 
and its r1 to authenticate reader 
- Calculate number of reads  
TCn−1 = TCn – 1 
-  if TS1 is verified, it’s updated to TS2  
- M6 = Ekx(TS2, TCn−1) 
- Send M6 to reader ← 
 
TID: Tag ID; Ky: Server/Reader shared key; r: random number; TCn: number of times a reader request information; Kx: Server/Tag 
shared key; TS: Timestamp; CertR: Reader security certificate; RBAC: role-based access control. 
Figure 2.6: Role-based access control protocol (RBAC) by B.Chen 
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2.1.3 Lightweight Protocols 
Successful businesses demand an efficient RFID system that is mainly based on a 
low computation at a low cost. Many recent RFID protocols use low-cost operations that 
are handled by low-cost passive tags for practical implementations. 
Fernando and Abawajy [19] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for 
Networked RFID Systems NRS, which is a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for 
an RFID system using low operations such as exclusive OR operation (XOR) and one-
way hash functions. However, Alagheband and Aref [8] reported NRS to be vulnerable to 
major attacks and specifically a full disclosure attack that compromises the whole RFID 
system. Alagheband and Aref improved NRS protocol and proposed NRS+ by adding 
three more hash functions to the authentication message to increase the system security. 
X. Chen et al. [20] noted that the NRS+ protocol is exposed to desynchronization and 
traceability attacks by using one random number for the tag and reader. Thus, X. Chen 
proposed NRS++ to improve the security flaws in the previous versions of NRS by 
generating two different random numbers, r1 and r2, for the tag and reader using a 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to defend against replay attack. In Figure 2.7, 
the authentication message M3 is encrypted using the tag’s random number r1 and 
reader’s random number r2 to provide message integrity, so the tag cannot verify any 
modified message. NRS++ uses fewer hash functions, which resulted in less computation 
overhead and storage space than the other versions, with more security power. 
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Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Update secrets in Database 
IDnew = ID ⊕ (r2right||K1left) 
K1new = H[(K1right||r1left) ⊕ r2] 
Step 1: 
- Generate random no. r 
- Calculate M1 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r) 
M2 = r ⊕ K1 
- Send to tag M1||M2 → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Extract r1 = N ⊕ K1 
- Compute C2 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r||r1) 
- Verify C2 = M3 
If equal: 
Generate random no. r2 
M4 = r2 ⊕ K1 
M5 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r1||r2) 
If not equal: terminate 
- Send M4||M5 → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Extract r as r = M2 ⊕ K1 
- Compute C1 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r) 
If C1 = M1, generate r1 
N = r1 ⊕ K1 
M3 = H(EPC ⊕ K1|| r||r1) 
Else termination 
- ← Send M3||N to reader 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Extract r2 as r2 = M4 ⊕ K1 
- Compute C3 = H(EPC ⊕ K1||r1||r2) 
- Verify C3 = M5 
If equal: Update the secrets.  
If not equal: terminate  
ID, EPC: Tag identifier; H(): one-way hash function; K1: Server/Tag shared key; r, r1, r2: random No; ⊕/||: XOR and concatenation 
operation. 
Figure 2.7: Mutual authentication protocol for networked RFID systems (NRS++) by X. Chen 
C. Chen [21] proposed Anti-Counting Security Protocol (ACSP) as another 
lightweight protocol for RFID systems to defend from a counter attack, which is defined 
as the attacker’s ability to count the number of objects in a system. Safkhani et al. [22] 
reported ACSP to be vulnerable to major attacks, including the forward/backward 
traceability attack. Safkhani further proposed ACSP+ to improve Chen’s protocol. Later, 
X. Chen [20] pointed out that ACSP protocol is not secure and proposed ACSP++ to 
withstand DoS and forward/backward traceability attacks. ACSP++ enhances the session 
identifier (SID) update, which is used to verify the current session, and tag identification 
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phases that suffer from different attacks in ACSP and ACSP+ versions. In ACSP++ as 
depicted in Figure 2.8, a tag identifier (TID) is added to the identification message as (
, R4, R5, TID) instead of ( , R4, R5), and the authentication message ((
, R4, R5, TID) is replaced with ( , R5, TID) to overcome DoS attack 
and to modify the TID in the identification phase. The update phase of every key is 
associated with two separate nonce values to avoid forward and backward traceability. 
Reader R Tag T 
(SID Update Phase) Step 1: 
- Generate nonce R1 
- Send the following to tag: 
, R1⊕SID, H( , R1, SID) → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Extract R2 and verify H( , R2, R1, SID) 
- Update SID as SIDnew =  H(SID||R2||R1) 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Extract R1 to verify H( , R1, SID) 
- Generate R2 
- Update SID 
SIDnew =  H(SID||R2||R1) 
SIDold = SIDcur 
- ← Send to reader confirmation: 
, R2 ⊕ SID, H( , R2, R1, SID) 
 
(Tag Identification Phase) Step1: 
- Generate R3, R4 
- Send the following messages to tag → 
a) , SID1⊕ R3, H( , R3, SID)) 
b) , SID ⊕ TID ⊕ R4, H( , R4, SID, TID)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Authenticate tag 
- Extract R5’ to verify H( , R4, R5, TID) 
- If not verified: stop the session and send  → 
 
- If verified: update TID as TIDnew = H(TID||R4||R5) 
TIDold = TID 
- Send ( , H( , R5, TID) → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Extract R3’ to verify H( , R3, SID) 
If not verified: wait until next run. 
If verified: respond with step3. 
 
Step 3: 
- Extract R4’ to verify H( , R4, SID, TID) 
- Generate R5 
- ← Send ( , TID ⊕ R5, H( , R4, R5, TID) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Calculate and verify H( , R5, TID) 
- If not verified: stop the session. 
- If verified: update the tag identifier as TIDnew = H(TID||R4||R5) 
R1, R2, R3, R4, R5: nonce; : Select/ query commands; SIDcur/ SIDnew: Current/ New session identifier; 
: SID update/ Update knowledge message; TIDcur/TIDnew: Current/ New unique identifier; : 
Identification/ authentication messages. 
Figure 2.8: Anti-counting security protocol (ACSP++) by X. Chen 
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Even though the protocol improved the security weaknesses of all of the ACSP 
versions, it did not lower the computation overhead nor the storage space. 
Chien and Huang [23] presented LAP, which is a lightweight authentication 
protocol to solve the vulnerabilities in the authentication protocol of Li et al. [24] and 
enhance the computational cost from O(n) to O(1) in identifying tags in RFID systems. 
The security of LAP protocol is based on a synchronized PRNG between the reader and 
tag using a secret key, secret ID, and index pseudonym. In Figure 2.9, LAP protocol uses 
the rotate operator on the message and left/right operator for the divided rotation during 
the messages that were exchanged to form a secure permutation. Random numbers are 
used to shift the secret values of the tag to be used safely in communication. Then, the 
random number is XORed with the shifted secret value to retrieve a tag by the server 
securely. The server uses the index pseudonym (IDS) to quickly identify the tag in the 
database instead of computing PIDL ⊕ PIDR for every tag to make the computation 
O(1). 
LAP protocol is resistant to replay attack, DoS, and forward security. It can be 
employed easily by different standards such as EPC Gen2 and ISO 15693 [25] for 
practical implementation. However, the protocol was noted as being partially secure 
against traceability and synchronization attacks, since a tag can be traced between two 
successful sessions if the tag could not update its IDS. 
Burmester and Munilla [26] proposed a lightweight mutual authentication 
protocol called Flyweight that is based on exchanging messages using only PRNG. Their 
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protocol is based on a shared PRNG algorithm between the tags and back-end server that 
takes the same seed to produce the same output. The concept of the protocol is to use 
three consecutive numbers—RN1, RN2, and RN3—generated by the same PRNG in the 
server, and the tags of five numbers if an active adversary is presented, such as in Figure 
2.10. Furthermore, RFID tags precompute the values to the server challenging the 
response so that an adversary can be detected based on the response time from the tag. 
The protocol can provide mutual authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and forward 
Server S: flag, Xold, Xnew, IDSold, IDSnew, SID Reader R Tag T: {SID, IDS, X} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Search IDSi 
- If IDS == IDSold: flag = 0, X = Xold 
- If IDS == IDSnew: flag = 1, X = Xnew 
- g’ = g(R1||R2||X) 
- SID’ = rotate(SID, g’) 
- Verify R’ as R’ = left(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- Compute R’’ = right(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- If flag = 1 
• IDSold = IDSnew 
• Xold = Xnew 
- Else 
• IDSnew = g(IDS||SID’) 
• Xnew = g(X||g’) 
- Send R’’ to reader → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- When OK is received, send SID to R → 
Step 1: 
- Generate R1. 
- Send Query||R1 to T → 
 
 
 
- Forward R1||R2||R’||IDS to S ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Forward R’’ to T → 
 
 
 
 
- Forward ACK to S ← 
 
 
- Generate R2 
- Compute g’ = g(R1||R2||X) 
- SID’ = rotate(SID, g’) 
- R’ = left(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- Send R2||R’||IDS to R ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Verify R’’ right(SID’ ⊕ g’) 
- Update: 
• IDS = g(IDS||SID’) 
• X = Xnew = g(X||g’) 
- Send ACK to R ← 
SID: Secure ID; PID: Partial ID; IDS: Index pseudonym; g(): Random No. generator; X: l-bit secret key; R1, R2: Random 
numbers; Rotate(): Rotation function; Left(s): Left half of s; Right(s): Right half of s; ACK: Acknowledgement.   
Figure 2.9: Lightweight authentication protocol (LAP) by Chien 
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and backward security. Besides, it provides robust synchronization, since the server keeps 
a record for the current and next response value of the tag. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
- Check if RN1 = RN1cur 
• cnt = 1 
• Generate RN2, send RN2 to R → 
- If RN1 = RN1next 
• cnt = 0 
• Update values in DB 
• Send updated RN2 to R → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- If RN = RN3, and cnt = 0 
• Tag is authenticated 
- If RN = RN4 
• Send RN3, store RN5 
• Update values 
• Send RN3 to R 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- If RN5 is correct 
• Authenticate T 
• Update values 
- Else terminate 
Step 1:. 
- Send Query to T → 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Forward RN1 to S ← 
 
 
 
 
 
- Forward RN2 to T → 
 
 
 
 
 
- Forward RN4 to S ← 
 
 
 
 
- Forward RN3 to T → 
 
 
 
- Forward RN5 to S ← 
 
- RN1 = gtag (state) 
- Set alarm cnt = 1 
- Send RN1 to R ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- If RN2 is correct to authenticate S 
• Generate RN3, RN4, RN5 
• Cnt = 0 
- If cnt = 0, send RN3 to R ← 
- If cnt = 1, send RN4 to R ← 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- If RN3 is correct and cnt = 1 
• Send RN5 to R ← 
- Else terminate 
RN: Random numbers output of the same generator function                        cnt: l-bit flag                                            
Figure 2.10: Flyweight mutual authentication protocol by Burmeter and Munilla 
S. Lee et al. [27] proposed a lightweight protocol (MASS) for RFID systems 
using XOR and a one-way hash function to conform to the scarce resources of RFID tags. 
The concept of the MASS protocol is to challenge the tag with a fresh random string 
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every session, and the tag responds using the reader’s value and its own random key to 
authenticate the reader ad, as depicted in Figure 2.11. The secret key is shared between 
entities, and all of the messages are encrypted during transmission. However, Zuo [28] 
conducted a survivability experiment on the authentication protocol proposed by S. Lee 
et al. and defined the vulnerability of the protocol to replay, desynchronize, and 
impersonate attacks. Zuo concluded from his experiment that the system could employ 
two different values for the keys (old, new) to recognize the tag and overcome the 
desynchronization problem. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
- Generate l-bit string str 
- Send str to tag → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Search database to match key Ki 
- If found proceed to update key 
- Retrieve rB from rC 
- Ki = h(Ki) 
- r’C = h(rB ⊕ Ki ⊕ str) 
- Send r’C to tag → 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate l-bit string rA 
- rB = h(rA ⊕ Ki ⊕ str) 
- rC = h(rB ⊕ Ki ⊕ str) 
- Send rB, rC to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Verify r’C = rC 
- If verified, update key 
Ki: Tag/server shared secret key; h(): One-way hash function 
Figure 2.11: Lightweight protocol based on synchronized secret (MASS) by S. Lee 
To reduce the communication time during the authentication session, K. Lee et al. 
[29] proposed Efficient Passively-Untraceable Authentication Protocol (EP-UAP). The 
concept of EP-UAP is that the system precomputes all of the necessary computations 
before the system initialization, so only low computation overhead is required on the tag 
side during the process phase. The protocol is based on Randomized Hash-Lock protocol, 
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which uses a static identifier, and its strong security against traceability depends mainly 
on PRNG to randomize the responses, as explained in Figure 2.12. Since precomputing 
all of the possible random numbers and responses requires a storage memory for all of 
the precomputed data in the database, EP-UAP is preferred for small to medium 
networks, as the storage memory increases when the number of tags increases. The 
protocol shows considerable improvement over the randomized hash lock protocol in 
terms of computation time, in that only requires 40 ms for authentication; this is similar 
to LRMAP, which is the most efficient one in stateful protocols. However, it requires 100 
MB of database storage memory. The protocol provides integrity due to the two 
randomly generated nonce values that are used from both tag and reader and is secure 
against passive attacks and traceability due to the random responses. However, the EP-
UAP protocol seems to be vulnerable to active attacks such as impersonate and replay 
attacks, since the random responses depend on the database/reader. It also requires high 
storage capacity in the database side. 
Reader Tag 
Step 1: 
- Generate RR 
- Send Query, RR to tag → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Search for IDi1R 
- Verify H(IDi1R||RR) = mTR to authenticate the tag. 
- Compute mRT = H(ID
i
2R||RT) 
- Send mRT to tag→ 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate RT 
- Compute mTR = H(ID1T||RR) 
- Send mRT, RT to reader ← 
 
 
 
Pre-compute cT = H(ID2T||RT) 
 
 
Step 4: 
- If mRT = cT, reader is authenticated. 
H: One-way hash function; ID: Tag identifier; RR, RT: nonce generated by reader/tag; m: Authentication challenge; c: 
Authentication challenge response. 
Figure 2.12: Efficient passively-untraceable authentication protocol (EP-UAP) by K. Lee 
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To defend against a desynchronization attack, Rahman and Ahamad [30] 
proposed a Desynchronization attack-resistant Robust Authentication Protocol (DRAP) in 
the wireless identification and sensing platforms (WISP), where RFID technology is 
combined with sensor nodes. Their protocol mechanism is to decrease the tag collision 
that leads to DoS attack, as shown in Figure 2.13. The technique is to reduce the collision 
rate at the link layer and maintain the system’s efficiency. The protocol also detects the 
DoS attack and recovers the synchronization state of the system. It has higher resources 
than passive tags, which allow higher security implementation. Yet, it has a short distance 
limitation, where tags can only function less than 1–2 m away from readers. 
Server S Reader R: IDi: Kiprev, Ki, Diprev Tag T: Ki, IDi, Δ 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
- Generate random nr. 
- Send nr to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Generate P(Ki ⊕ nr||ni) for all tags to verify αi. 
If there is a match: 
- Decrypt αi and βi  
- Retrieve D 
- If Dnewi is not equal to Dnew then update: 
Kiprev = Ki 
X = h(Ki) 
αj = P(X ⊕ nr||ni) 
Ki = h(x) 
Dipev = Dinew 
- Else ignore the message and αj = rand 
If there is no match: 
- Generate P(Kiprev ⊕ nr||ni) for all tags to verify αi 
- If correct: 
- Decrypt αi and βi  
- If Dnewi is not equal to Doldi then update: 
αj = P(h(Kiprev) ⊕ nr||ni) 
Diprev = Dinew 
- Else ignore the message and αj = rand 
Else ignore the message and αj = rand  
- Send αj to tag → 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
If (Δ ≤ Dnew – Dold) 
- Generate random ni 
- αi = P(Ki ⊕ nr||ni) 
- βi = EKwti(h(IDi) ⊕ Dnew) 
- Send αi, βi, ni to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Y = h(Ki) 
- Generate P(Y ⊕ nr||ni) to verify αj 
- if correct: Ki = h(Y) 
P(): Pseudorandom No. generator; Δ: Activity threshold; D: Sensor value; Ki: Secret number; ID: Tag identifier; h(): One-way hash 
function. 
Figure 2.13: Desynch attack-resistant robust authentication protocol (DRAP) by Rahman 
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Authentication in most RFID protocols is executed between one reader and one 
tag at a time. Liu et al. [31] proposed a grouping proofs-based authentication protocol 
(GUPA) to enable authenticating multiple tags and multiple readers simultaneously, such 
that multiple readers can authenticate a single tag, and a single reader can authenticate 
multiple tags in large-scale RFID. GUPA protocol is based on hierarchical identification 
between independent subgroups in a distributed RFID system, and the use of an 
asymmetric denial mechanism to resist denial-of-proof attack (DoP). For the anonymous 
authentication of a new entity, GUPA deploys a ring signature using lightweight 
cryptography (elliptic curve). It also uses lightweight bitwise operations for readers and 
tags secret information updates, PRNGs, one-way hash functions, timestamps for session 
freshness, and access lists for each legal reader/tag during system initialization as identity 
flags to prevent forgery and tracking attack, as fully explained in Figure 2.14. Since the 
flags are chosen randomly from the pseudonym index, queries and responses are 
independent for each session to resist DoP attack; hence, illegal proofs are eliminated 
during authentication. 
Database: DB Reader: Rj Tag: Ta 
Initialization Phase: 
1- Generate PRN rDB 
2- Send rDB to tag → 
 
6- Verify H1 in database for match 
7- H1 = (ΔRj||LR||rTy) 
8- PRNG (ΔRj) 
9- Send H1||PRNG (ΔRj) to tag → 
 
Authentication Phase: 
 
  
 
3- Generate rTy 
4- H1(LR||rDB) 
5- Send rTy||H1(LR||rDB) to DB ← 
 
 
 
 
10- PRNG−1(ΔRj) to obtain ΔRj 
11- H1 = (ΔRj||LR||rTy) to authenticate DB 
12- Add ΔRj to LR 
LR: Local access list; ΔRj: Reader’s information; H(): One-way hash function. 
Figure 2.14: Grouping proofs-based authentication protocol (GUPA) by Liu for a 
single-reader—single-tag case 
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Since tag collision is a major problem in the large-scale networks, Rahman and 
Ahamad [32] proposed two probabilistic batch authentication protocols to determine the 
valid tags efficiently and accurately in large-scale systems. FTest is a protocol based on 
Frame Slotted Aloha algorithm that is used to reduce the probability of collision slots. 
The other protocol is GTest, which is a protocol based on group batch authentication that 
is used to reduce the cost of detecting counterfeit tags. Their protocols use simple 
lightweight operations such as XOR and cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) with a shared 
key for each group of tags. The theory in both protocols is not to send the tag ID when 
responding, but rather accept or reject a tag by estimating the number of fake tags. In the 
FTest protocol that is depicted in Figure 2.15, a counterfeit threshold parameter is used in 
the system to reduce the number of rounds in the detection process and response time of 
the protocol, so that the entire tag responses do not need to be checked. Instead, the 
detection will stop if the percentage of counterfeit tags exceeds the counterfeit threshold. 
In GTest, the reader randomly selects a population of tags to authenticate. If one 
counterfeit tag is detected, the batch of tags will be considered invalid. The reader needs 
to read a large amount of data to identify the validity of a batch in GTest, so the reader 
still consumes time through the computation overhead from the tag search. Both FTest 
and GTest protocols are proved to be secure against tracking and privacy attacks since 
tags responses are based on dynamic frame size, random numbers, and ID that is not 
transmitted during communication. However, the FTest shows less execution time and 
better performance over GTest. 
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Server S Reader R Tag T: Shared group key ki 
Group Identification Phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
Authentication Initialization Phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counterfeit Detection Phase: 
 
4- Reconstruct RVS as only valid tags can 
compute correct h() 
5- Accept valid tags if RVS = RV 
1- Send nonce nr to tag→ 
 
3- Find a group key to decrypt the message. 
4- Identify the group of tags based on the group key. 
 
1- Send to server “Start authentication” ← 
2- Receive (f, r) from server 
3- Broadcast frame size and random no. 
 
 
6- Generate RV based on responses 0, 1, coll. 
7- Turn collision slot into singleton by removing one 
tag (removed tags remain silent until next phase) 
8- Send RV to server for verification. 
 
1- Send random nr from server to rem tags → 
 
3- Forward RV to server ← 
2- Respond by h(ki||nr) ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4- Each tag compute its slot position 
SP = h(id, r) mod f = 0 or 1 
5- Send SP to reader with random bits ← 
 
 
 
 
2- Respond h(id||nr) 
n: Nonce value; ki: Shared group key; h(): One-way hash function; SP: Slot position within frame; id: Tag ID; f: Frame size; r: Random N; 
RV: Response vector generated by reader; RVs: Response vector generated by server; rem: Set of tags removed to reduce collision slot.  
Figure 2.15: Batch authentication protocol based on Frame Slotted Aloha (FTest) by Rahman 
Another anti-collision security protocol (ACS) is proposed by Keqiang et al. [33] 
for a high-efficiency RFID system combining the chaotic sequence generator with the 
dynamic frame-slotted ALOHA algorithm for fast tag identification. The protocol scheme 
is based on a logistic mapping structure with XOR operation and spreading operation to 
generate real-time keys in a chaotic sequence that are used in authentication messages. 
Keys are updated in each response from tag to reader and reader to tag during the same 
session using iteration equations that are known only to the server and tag, such as in 
Figure 2.16. The protocol is effective against counterfeits and impersonates attacks, as 
the authentication scheme not only depends on the iterated key but also on spreading 
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code and random numbers, so faking at least one of them will result in a wrong response. 
The protocol requires only four message exchanges, low hardware cost, and low 
computation cost on the tag side. It also has lower energy consumption than other heavy 
and simple weight protocols because XOR uses less energy than symmetric encryption 
and hash functions. 
Server S: K0 Reader R Tag T: K’0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- K0 = Master key, x0 = K0 to compute xi 
- Verify ChaosSpec using xi: 
• If there is collision, go to step5. 
• If no collision, proceed. 
- Perform one-time iteration to get  
xi+1 = Ki+1 
- Extract R’0 from H’(R0) and verify 
R’0 = R0  
- Tag is authenticated. 
- Extract ID from H’(ID) 
- Perform R1 iteration to get xj,   
j = (r+R1+R0) 
- Kj = xj 
- H(R1) = R1 ⨁ Kj 
- Send to reader (H(R1)) ⊗ ChaosSpec → 
Step 1: 
- Generate and send a frame size R0 
to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Send (H’(R0)||H’(ID)||R1) ⊗ 
ChaosSpec, and R0 to S ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Send (H(R1)) ⊗ ChaosSpec → 
 
 
Step 5: Collision case 
- Increase tag’s slot counter by 1 
- Restart identification process in 
Step2 
Step 6: No authentication occurs 
- Issue AdjustQuery command 
- Adjust R0 to decide a new frame 
size 
- Send search signal to rest of tags 
→ 
 
Step 2: 
- Receive R0. 
- Choose slot index with the value in [1, R0] 
- Reset time slot counter = slot-index 
- r = 20, i = (r+R0), x’0 = K’0 
- x’k+1 = rx’k (1-x’k) iteration = x’i 
- x’i = ChaosSpec 
- Perform one-time iteration to get 
K’i+1 = x’i+1 
- H’(R0) = R0 ⨁ K’i+1 
- H’(ID) = K’i+1 ⨁ ID 
- Generate random R1 
- Send (H’(R0)||H’(ID)||R1) ⊗ ChaosSpec ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Perform the equations to get K’j = x’j 
- Calculate R’1 = H(R1) ⨁ K’j 
- If R’1 = R1, then K’j = Kj 
- R is authenticated 
R0: Frame size; i: Number of iterations; K’0: Tag key; K0: Server master key; K’i+1: Real-time key; H(), H’(): One-way hash 
functions; ChaosSpec: Spreading code; ID: Tag’s ID; R1: Random number generated by tag; r: Constant value to put the equation in 
chaotic state. 
Figure 2.16: Anti-collision security protocol (ACS) by Keqiang 
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Cho et al. [34] proposed a hash-based mutual authentication protocol (HBA) to 
defend against the brute force attack. This protocol was reported by Chang et al. [35] to 
be vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) and replay attacks. Later, Chang et al. proposed 
an improved (HBA+) protocol to avoid DoS and replay attacks using a shared PRNG 
algorithm between the server and tag to produce the same output that is used in updating 
the protocol values, as in Figure 2.17. Also, the confidentiality in the protocol is based on 
protecting the secret value datai using reader ID (Rid), which is only known to a 
legitimate reader and server. The improved protocol of Chang is considered to be 
efficient and secure against DoS attack, traceability, and forward secrecy. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
Search the database using I: 
- Found: 
I = Inew {EPCi, Auknew, Acknew, datai} 
I = Iold {EPCi, Aukold, Ackold, datai} 
M1’ = Auknew ⨁ Inew ⨁ PRNG(EPCk ⨁ 
Acknew ⨁ Rt ⨁ Rr) to authenticate T. 
- Not Found: termination. 
- B = datai ⨁ Ridk 
- M2 = PRNG(Auknew ⨁ Rt) ⨁ Acknew 
- C = H(datai ⨁ Rr) 
- Update database values and keys: 
Aukold = Auknew 
Auknew = PRNG(Auknew) 
Ackold = Acknew 
Acknew = PRNG(Acknew) 
Iold = Inew 
Inew = PRNG(Acknew ⨁ Inew) 
- send {B, C, M2} → 
Step 1:  
- Generate random No. Rr → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- A = H(Rid ⨁ Rr) 
- ← {M1, Rt, I, A, Rr} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Obtain datai from B 
- C’ = H(datai ⨁ Rr) 
- send M2 → 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate random No. Rt 
- M1 = Auk ⨁ I ⨁ PRNG (EPC ⨁ Ack ⨁ 
Rr ⨁ Rt) 
- ← {M1, Rt, I} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Compute M2’ = PRNG(Auk ⨁ Rt) ⨁ 
Ack 
- Update tag values and keys 
Rr, Rt: Random No. of reader/tag; Auk: Authentication key of tags shared with server; Rid: Reader ID; EPC: Electronic product 
code of tag; Ack: Access key of tags shared with server; I: Index value of tag; H(): One-way hash function; datai: Secret 
information of the tag’s object. 
Figure 2.17: Hash-based mutual authentication protocol (HBA+) by Chang 
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Z.Liu et al. [36] proposed variable linear shift-based authentication protocol 
(VLP) to support the implementation of RFID for the new EPC Gen2v2 standard, satisfy 
its security features of untraceability and access control, and reduce a tag’s read range. In 
Figure 2.18, the protocol is based on a lightweight encryption function called Variable 
Linear Feedback Shift Register (VLFSR), which is implemented at the application-
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) level. In every session, mutual authentication involves 
different random numbers from the tag and reader combined with the new secret value 
SID stored in the database to provide resistance against active attacks. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: Authenticate and Update 
1- Find an SIDj match in database based on UID 
2- Extract Rt1, Rt2  
3- (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ SIDj 
4- Find mj from Mj table based on SIDj 
5- Bb = VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, mj) 
6- If Bb = Bt, proceed to update 
• mj+1 = (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ mj 
• SIDj+1 = VLFSR (Rt1||Rt2, mj) 
• Store new values in Mj and keep the old in 
Mj−1 tables. 
7- If Bb ≠ Bt, find mj and SIDj from Mj−1 table 
and do step3 
8- If no match is found, protocol will stop. 
 
Step 6:  
- Send to reader VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, SIDj) → 
 
Step 1:  
- Generate random Rr 
- Send Rr to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Send to server Rr, Bt, (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ SIDj and 
UID ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 7:  
- Send to reader VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, SIDj) → 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Generate random Rt1, Rt2 
- Secret value = mj 
- Bt = VLFSR (Rt1||Rr, mj) 
 
Step 3: 
- Send to reader Bt, (Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ SIDj ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 8: Authenticate R and S 
- Authentication via received msg. 
- mj+1 = Rt2||Rt1) ⨁ mj 
- SIDj+1 = VLFSR (Rt1||Rt2, mj) 
SID: Session secure ID of tag; UID: Unique ID of tag; Rr: Reader random No.; Rt1, Rt2: Random No. generated by tag; mj: Secret value used 
in a session; VLFSR(): Variable LFSR function. 
Figure 2.18: Variable linear shift-based authentication protocol (VLP) by Z.Liu 
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Another protocol (OMP) is proposed by Niu et al. [37] mainly for passive tag 
ownership transfer using a lightweight authentication mechanism to support EPC Gen2 
standard. Since the ownership transfer is based on transferring the keys, the OMP 
protocol aims to prove the possession of the shared secret key to a tag and reader without 
disclosing it using ultra-lightweight permutation operation (Per), as in Figure 2.19. Yet, 
the protocol has no mechanism to check the freshness of the message that is sent by a 
legitimate reader. 
Server S Reader R: K, KM, EPC, RID1 Tag T: K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS 
Mutual 
Authentication: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Generate random rnd1, rnd2 of 96 bits 
2- Ai = rnd1i ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ 
RID2i) 
3- Bi = rnd2i ⨁ PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
4- Ci PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ RID2i) 
5- Send Ai, Bi, Ci to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9- Verify D: 
- D’i = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
- If D is verified, tag is authenticated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6- Extract rnd1, rnd2 
- rnd1i = Ai ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(Ki ⨁ 
RID2i) 
- rnd2i = Bi ⨁PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ Ki) 
- C’i = PRNG(rnd1i ⨁ RID1i) ⨁ PRNG(rnd2i ⨁ RID2i) 
 
7- If C = C’, reader authenticated 
- Ki+1 = Per(rnd1i, Ki) ⨁ K(i+1 mod 6) 
- IDSi+1 = Per(rnd2i, Ki) ⨁ Ki 
- Di = PRNG(Ki+1 ⨁ IDSi+1), where i = 1 to 6 
 
8- Send D to reader←  
K: Secret shared key for owners; KM: Master key to modify K. EPC: Static ID of a tag. RID: ID of reader owning tag. IDS: Pointer to 
tag database. 
Figure 2.19: Passive tag ownership authentication protocol (OMP) by Niu 
Dass and Om [38] also proposed an efficient authentication protocol (SEAS) that 
uses lightweight operations and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for a low 
computational cost. Their scheme is based on a secure channel between the back-end 
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server and reader, prestored tags’ secret (SIDs) in the side of the tag, a one-way hash 
function of the tag ID in the server side, and rewritable memory with a flag indicator in 
the server side to update the secret values. Any change to the messages transmitted leads 
to terminate the communication during the verification to resist security attacks, as shown 
in Figure 2.20. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
Search the database using h(ID): 
- Not Found: termination 
- Found: verify V 
V’ = PRNG(Snew ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
Send Snew to reader → 
Flag = 0 
 
V” = PRNG(Sold ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
Send Sold to reader → 
Flag = 1 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Flag = 0 → S = Snew 
U = h (Snew||M) 
Sold = Snew 
Snew = Snew ⨁ U 
 
- Flag = 1 → S = Sold 
U = h (Sold||M) 
Sold = Sold 
Snew = Sold ⨁ U 
Step 1:  
- Generate random No. NR → 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- ← {V,H, NR, NT} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Reader takes Snew or Sold 
- M = PRNG(Snew, old, NR) 
- N = PRNG(M) 
- Send N to tag → 
- ← send M to server 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate random No. NT 
- V = PRNG (S ⨁ NR ⨁ NT) 
- H = h (ID) 
- ← {V, H, NT} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- To authenticate reader: 
Calculate M’ = PRNG(S, NR) 
Calculate N’ = PRNG(M’) 
Verify N’ = N 
- If equal calculate U = h (S||M’) 
- Update S = S ⨁ U 
h(): One-way hash function; NR, NT: Random No. generated by reader/tag; S: Secret value of tag; ID: ID pseudonym of tag; 
Snew, Sold: Current and old session secrets of tag. 
Figure 2.20: Efficient authentication protocol (SEAS) by Dass and Om 
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An alternative solution to replace the central database in the RFID system is to 
use a serverless model in which the database server does not maintain a connection with 
the readers and tags during the communication. Regarding this challenge, Mtita et al. [39] 
proposed (SAP), a serverless security protocol used for the mass authentication of RFID 
tags in the presence of untrusted readers. In SAP protocol, the reader and tag do not 
communicate with the back-end server; instead, they authenticate each other using only 
ephemeral of the tag’s secrets that expire within a given time, as shown in Figure 2.21. 
Verification and authentication between the reader and tag are done during the 
authentication phase to exchange the data and generate the session key locally in both tag 
and reader for their next communication. The protocol has also been proved using the 
CryptoVerif tool [40], which was shown to have low computation overhead and 
resources. 
Server: S Reader: Rj Tag: Ti 
Initialization Phase: 
2- Generate Kij, tempij, ARij (access right) for 
each tag derived from time window and start 
date 
Kij = HMACidi(Wsj||ARij) 
3- Build lists of authenticated tags Lj for Rj 
Lj − {(temp1j, K1j), (temp2j, K2j),.., (tempij, 
Kij)} 
4- Send Lj, ARij, Wsj to Rj → 
 
Mutual Authentication Phase: 
 
 
1- Request permission from server S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- Generate rj 
2- Send to tag A= WSj, ARij, rj → 
 
6- Verify H’ij = HMACKij (ri||rj) 
If equal: Ti is authenticated 
If not equal: Kij is not in the list and tag is 
not authorized 
7- Generate timestamp tj and calculate 
Vij = HMACKij (ri||tj) 
9- Send to tag C =  ti, Vij → 
 
 
12- Generate session key 
KS = HMACKij (tj||ri WSj) 
- Ti has Timestamp TSYS and idi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3- Generate ri 
4- Hij = HMACKij (ri||rj) 
5- Send to reader B = Hij, ri ← 
 
 
 
 
 
10- Verify V’ij = HMACKij (ri||tj) 
If equal: Rj is authenticated 
11- Update TSYS = tj 
 
13- Generate session key 
KS = HMACK’ij (tj||ri WSj) 
TSYS: Tag static timestamp; tj: Reader timestamp; idi: Tag ID; Kij: Tag’s key; tempij: Temporary tag ID; ARij: Access rights; Wsj: 
Time window; Ks: Session key; Lj: List of authorized tags; ri, rj: Reader/Tag random No.  
Figure 2.21: Serverless security authentication protocol (SAP) by Mtita 
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2.1.4 Ultra-Lightweight Protocols 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, passive tags are small chips with scarce 
resources that can only support low-cost operations. The goal of ultra-lightweight 
protocols is to reduce the cost of RFID systems at a minimum and provide strong security 
for promising future use. In this regard, Sundaresan et al. [5] introduced an ultra-
lightweight serverless protocol (STS) using only simple XOR and 128-bit PRNG 
operations that require less than 2000 gates, three random number generation on the tag, 
and two message exchanges. In Figure 2.22, the STS protocol mechanism is to use a 
blind factor to hide the pseudo-random numbers that are used in communication between 
readers and tags to overcome impersonation attacks. An RFID tag is also able to preserve 
its location privacy by responding as a noise tag. Moreover, the protocol does not employ 
a one-way hash function nor any encryption conforming to EPC C1 G2 Standards. 
Aggarwal and Das [41] proposed the CHW+ protocol, which is based on a 
previous version introduced by Y. Chen, Wang, and Hwang (CWH) [42]. In Figure 2.23, 
the protocol CHW+ solves the problem of full disclosure attack due to the simple XOR 
operation that is used in the authentication message, which uses the bit rotation and 
shifting operation on the message before transmission to increase the protocol 
complexity. CWH+ protocol is resistant to replay attack, forge attack, and DoS with a 
very efficient computation. 
Huang and Li [43] proposed and implemented two improved protocols of RFID 
mutual authentication based on generating PadGen function in the ISO 18000-6C [44] 
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Server: ts Reader R Tag T 
Setup Phase: 
- Stores access list (AL) of all n tags: 
h(TID1, ts1) = id1, rts1, ctr1, ctrmax1 
h(TIDn, tsn) = idn, rtsn, ctrn, ctrmaxn 
- Establish shared rts between a reader and 
each tag to be searched. 
 
Search Phase: 
- Server is offline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Precompute and store id = 
h(TID, ts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
1- Check that ctr <= ctrmax 
2- Generate PRN rr 
3- B = rtsj ⨁ idi 
4- M1 = idi ⨁ PRNG (rtsj ⨁ rr) 
5- M2 = rr ⨁ B 
6- Broadcast M1, M2 to all tags 
→ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
1- Extract tr from M4 
2- Verify rtsj = M3 ⨁ PRNG 
(idj ⨁ tr) 
3- If verified, tag is 
authenticated 
4- Update rtsj = M3 ⨁ PRNG 
(idj ⨁ tr) 
ctr = ctr + 1 
 
- Stores id = h(TID, ts). 
- Stores for each reader: 
rts1, rts1
−1, ctr1, ctrmax1, rr1
−1 
rtsm, rtsm
−1, ctrm, ctrmaxm, rrm
−1 
- ctr = 0. 
 
 
Step 2: 
1- B = rts ⨁ id 
2- Extract rr from M2 = B ⨁ rr 
3- Check rr: 
- If rr = rr
−1, a replayed msg, exit. 
- If rr ≠ rr
−1, proceed 
4- Verify id = M1 ⨁ PRNG (rts ⨁ rr): 
- If equal, reader is authenticated 
- If not equal, repeat using rts−1. 
- If not equal, respond with λ and exit. 
5- If id is verified, check if ctr < ctrmax: 
- Generate PRN tr 
- M3 = rts ⨁ PRNG (id ⨁ tr) 
- M4 = tr ⨁ B 
6- Update rr
−1 = rr 
7- If id is verified using rts: 
- Update rts−1 = rts 
- rts = PRNG (rts) 
- ctr = ctr + 1 
8- Send M3, M4 to reader ← 
AL: Access list for the reader; ts: Secret key of tag; rts, rts
−1: Shared secrets between reader/tag; B: Blind factor to hide PRN;     ctr: 
Counter value; ctrmax: Number of times a reader is pre-authorized to search; TID: Tag ID; id: hashed value of TID; rr: Random No. of 
reader in current session. 
Figure 2.22: Ultra-lightweight serverless authentication protocol (STS) by Sundaresan 
protocol to protect the memory with a 32-bit access password. The concept of their 
protocols is to cover up the tag’s access password (Apwd) before transmitting the data 
using a set of 16-bit random numbers such as RTx and RMx. One of the improved 
schemes, PadGen with XOR (PGX), implements XOR operation between the random 
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number sets and the PadGen function; the other protocol, PadGen with Mod (PGM), 
implements a Modulo operation (MOD9) in the eight-bit half of the 16-bit random 
number set (RTx, RMx) to be used in the PadGen function. Both improved schemes 
conform to the EPC C1 G2 standard, do not require any hash function or key exchange, 
do not involve synchronization for hash or key values, and also show better efficiency 
during implementation. The security level of the MOD scheme is higher due to the low-
cost implementation but requires a higher computation cost in PadGen than XOR. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- n = weight(r) 
- r’ = Rot(r,n) 
- r’prev = Rot(rprev, n) 
- Retrieve and verify TID to authenticate 
tag. 
- r’’ = Rot(r’, n) 
- r’’prev = Rot(r’prev, n) 
- t2 = (TID + r’’prev) ⋀ r’’ 
- Update rold = rprev, rprev = r’ 
- Send t2 to tag → 
 
Step 1: 
- Generate random r. 
- s = RID ⨁ r 
- n1 = weight(RID), n1 = no. of bit value 1 of 
RID 
- s’ = Rot(s, n1) 
- Send s’ to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Forward t1, r to server ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: 
- s = Rot’(s’, n1) 
- Retrieve r = RID ⨁ s 
- n1 = weight(r) 
- r’ = Rot(r, n1) 
- r’prev = Rot(rprev, n1) 
- t1 = (TID ⨁ r’prev) + (r’ ⋀ r’prev) 
- Send t1 to reader ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Compute r’’, r’’prev as the 
server 
- t’2 = (TID + r’’prev) ⋀ r’’ 
- Verify t’2 = t2 
- Update rprev = r’ 
RID: Reader ID; Rot(): Rotation function; TID: Tag ID; Weight(r): number of 1’s in the binary string shifts r to the left for  n bits. 
Figure 2.23: Improved authentication protocol (CWH+) by Aggarwal and Dass  
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Huang and Jiang [45] proposed an ultra-lightweight reader–tag mutual 
authentication protocol (MACC) based on Chien and Chen’s protocol [46] to overcome 
forge attacks, DoS, and forward security attacks. Although the improved scheme uses 
only lightweight operations such as RNG, PRNG, and XOR, it involves an exhaustive 
search in the database for tag pseudo-IDs in every session that leads to computational 
overhead, as shown in Figure 2.24. It also fails to resist tracking attacks. 
Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Verify VR using reader ID and r1 
- Search database for tag PIDi 
- Verify M1 as: r2 = M1 ⨁ Niold OR r2 = M1 ⨁ Ninew 
- Verify M2 as: M2 = P(EPCi||r1||r2||Ki
old or Ki
new) 
- M3 = P(EPCi||r2||Ni
x||Ki
x) x = old or new 
- Send M3 to reader → 
 
- If x = new, proceed to update 
Ni
old = Ni
new, Ni
new = P(Ni
new ⨁ r2) 
Ki
old = Ki
new, Ki
new = P(Ki
new ⨁ r2) 
PIDi
old = PIDi
new, PIDi
new = P(PIDi
new ⨁ r2) 
Step 1: 
- Generate r1 
- VR = h(RIDj ⨁ r1) 
- Send to tag r1 → 
 
Step 3: 
- Send to server (M1, M2, PIDi, r1, VR) 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Forward M3 to tag → 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate r2 
- M1 = Ni ⨁ r2 
- M2 = P(EPCi||r1||r2||Ki) 
- Send to reader (M1, M2, PIDi) ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Verify M3 = P(EPCi||r2||Ni||Ki) 
- Ni = P(Ni ⨁ r2) 
- Ki = P(Ki ⨁ r2) 
- PIDi = P(PIDi ⨁ r2) 
P: Access key with reader; PID: Pseudonym ID of tag; Ni: Nonce; EPC: Electronic product code for the tag; Ki: Authentication key. 
Figure 2.24: Ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocol (MACC) by Huang and Jiang 
Huang and Jiang [45] proposed another mutual authentication protocol (MACD) 
based on Chen and Deng’s scheme [47] to overcome forge attacks, DoS, replay attacks, 
and mainly the tag identification time. It is shown in Figure 2.25 that the MACD protocol 
uses ultra-lightweight operations and achieves a lower communication cost between tag 
and reader than the other improved scheme, MACC. 
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Server S Reader R Tag T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: 
- Search database for EPCi match 
- r2 = B ⨁ (Piold||r1) OR B ⨁ (Pinew||r1) 
- A’ = r1 ⨁ r2 ⨁ Piold or Pinew 
- Verify M1 = CRC(EPCi||A’|| B|| Ki
old or Ki
new) 
- M2 = CRC (EPCi||r2||Pi
x||Ki
x)  x = old, new 
- Send M2 to reader → 
 
 
 
- If x = new, proceed to update 
Pi
old = Pi
new, Pi
new = P(Pi
new ⨁ r2) 
Ki
old = Ki
new, Ki
new = P(Ki
new ⨁ r2) 
Step 1: 
- Generate r1 
- Send r1 to tag → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Send to server (M1, B, r1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: 
- Send M2 to tag → 
 
 
Step 2: 
- Generate r2 
- A = r1 ⨁ r2 ⨁ Pi 
- B = P(Pi||r1) ⨁ r2 
- M1 = CRC(EPCi||A||B||Ki) 
- Send to reader (M1, B) ← 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 6: 
- Verify M2 = CRC (EPCi||r2||Pi||Ki) 
- Pi = P(Pi ⨁ r2) 
- Ki = P(Ki ⨁ r2) 
P: Access key with reader; Ki: Authentication key; Ni: Nonce; EPC: Electronic product code for the tag; CRC(): Cyclic 
redundancy check function. 
Figure 2.25: Mutual authentication protocol (MACD) by Huang and Jiang 
Considering the complexity of the authentication protocol, Hopper and Blum 
proposed the first HB protocol to identify unaided humans to computers [48]. Many 
authors adopted the idea of HB protocol to identify tags in RFID networks. HB family 
protocols are based on the hard problems of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), which 
involves the calculation of inner products of binary vectors and Bernoulli noise bit 
generation [49]. In this regard, Lin and Song [50] proposed HBROT, which is one of the 
latest HB protocols that produce the key in each authentication round using the rotation 
function. The protocol is considered to be secure against most of the RFID attacks. 
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Another improvement of the HB protocol is proposed by Juels and Weis [51] as 
(HB+) to overcome the weaknesses of the original HB. The HB+ protocol involves two 
secret keys, x, and y, which are used with shared blind vectors between the reader and 
tag. The reader and tag verify the values that are computed to perform mutual 
authentication. Later, the protocol is reported by Gilbert et al. [52] to be vulnerable to the 
man-in-the-middle attack (MIM). Hence, Ouaskou et al. [53] proposed a variant of HB 
protocol based on Permutation function (HBPER). The protocol performs a permutation 
of the keys x,y during each round of the protocol to update the value of the keys, as 
shown in Figure 2.26. This method secures the protocol against the MIM attack that is 
reported in the HB+ protocol, although both protocols HB+ and HBPER almost have the 
same complexity. 
Reader R Tag T 
x = xk−1, …, x1, x0 
y = yk−1, …, y1, y0 
 
Step 1:  
- Generate random challenge (a) 
- Send (a) to T → 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
- Compute y = Per(y,a) 
- Compute x = Per(x,a) 
- Verify z = a . x 
x = xk−1, …, x1, x0 
y = yk−1, …, y1, y0 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
- Compute y = Per(y,a) 
- Compute x = Per(x,a) 
- Compute z = a . x ⨁ v 
(v = noise bit; v = 1 with probability of ) 
- Send z to R ← 
 
x: Shared key by tag and reader of k-bit; k: Length of secret keys; y: Shared key by tag and reader of k-bit; η = noise level ∈]0,1/2[). 
Figure 2.26: A variant of hb protocol based on permutation function (HBPER) by Ouaskou 
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2.2 Analysis and Security Evaluation 
In this section, we compare the different protocols in terms of computation, 
security requirements, and attacks resistance. Table 2.2.1 demonstrates the different 
operations computed by the tag in each protocol and the communication overhead based 
on the number of transmitted messages between tag and reader. 
2.2.1 Comparison of Computation Cost 
We denote TENC, TDEC, TPRNG, TRNG, TSMUL, TXOR, TCH, TH, TCRC, TROT, TSHIFT, 
TITER, TBIT, TSPR, TPER, TMOD, TVLFSR as the computation cost for encryption, decryption, 
pseudo-random number generator, random number generator, scalar multiplication, XOR, 
cryptographic hash, one-way hash function, cyclic redundancy check, rotation, shifting, 
iteration, bitwise operation, spreading, permutation, modulo, variable linear shift register 
function, respectively. Tag overhead is classified based on the cryptographic level of 
operations used in the protocol: high for symmetric key cryptography and scalar 
multiplication, medium for a one-way hash function, and low for other bitwise operations 
and random number generators. The passes are designated for the number of messages 
sent by a reader or a tag. 
2.2.2 Comparison of Security Threats 
Protocols resistance to different RFID threats is presented in Table 2.2, where we 
denote ST1 for a replay attack, ST2 for a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM), ST3 for 
eavesdropping, ST4 for an impersonating attack, ST5 for traceability, ST6 for 
desynchronization , ST7 for denial of service (DoS), and ST8 for other types of attack. 
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Table 2.2.1 Comparison of the Computation Cost on Tag 
Protocol Operations 
Tag 
Passes 
Reader 
Passes 
Tag Overhead 
SB-A [9] 1 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High 
SB-B [9] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 2 TPRNG 2 3 High 
EMA [6] 2 TSMUL + 2 TCH 2 1 High 
ECU [11] 2 TSMUL + 2 TCH 1 1 High 
SPA [12] 4 TSMUL + 1 TCH 1 1 High 
PII [13] 4 TSMUL + 3 TCH 1 1 High 
RUND [14] 2 TH     OR    1 TENC + 1 TPRNG 1 2 High 
IECC [15] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 High 
EECC [16] 2 TSMUL + 2 TH 1 2 High 
RBAC [18] 2 TENC + 2 TDEC + 1 TPRNG 2 2 High 
DRAP [30] 1 TENC + 3 TXOR + 3 TH + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG 1 2 High 
NRS [19] 10 TXOR + 3 TH 4 5 Medium 
NRS+ [8] 10 TXOR + 6 TH 4 5 Medium 
NRS++ [20] 8 TXOR + 4 TH 1 2 Medium 
ACSP [21] 3 TXOR + 7 TH + 4 TCRC 1 4 Medium 
ACSP+ [22] 4 TXOR + 8 TH 2 4 Medium 
ACSP++ [20] 6 TXOR + 8 TH 1 2 Medium 
MASS [28] 4 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
EP-UAP [29] 2 TH + 1 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
GUPA [31] 2 TH + 3 TPRNG + 19 TBIT 3 3 Medium 
HBA [34] 6 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG + 4 TMOD 1 2 Medium 
VLP [36] 2 TXOR + 2 TRNG + 3 TBIT + 2 TVLFSR 1 2 Medium 
SEAS [38] 1 TXOR + 2 TH + 1 TRNG + 3 TPRNG + 1 TBIT 1 2 Medium 
SAP [39] 2 TH + 2 TRNG 1 2 Medium 
LAP [23] 2 TXOR + 1 TRNG + 2 TPRNG + 1 TROT + 1 TSHIFT 2 2 Low 
Flyweight [26] 5 TPRNG 3 3 Low 
FTest [32]  1 TXOR + 3 TCRC 3 2 Low 
ACS [33] 3 TXOR + 2 TITER + 1 TSPR 1 2 Low 
HBA+ [35] 7 TXOR + 1 TRNG + 5 TPRNG 1 2 Low 
OMP [37] 12 TXOR + 6 TPRNG + 2 TPER 1 1 Low 
STS [5] 7 TXOR + 3 TPRNG 1 1 Low 
CWH+ [41] 2 TXOR + 5 TROT + 1 TSHIFT + TBIT 1 1 Low 
PGX [43] 8 TXOR + 2 TRNG 2 2 Low 
PGM [43] 4 TXOR + 2 TRNG + 32 TMOD 2 2 Low 
MACC [45] 6 TXOR + 5 TPRNG 1 2 Low 
MACD [45] 5 TXOR + 3 TPRNG + 1 TCRC 1 2 Low 
HBROT [50] 1 TRNG + 2 TROT + 1 TXOR + 1 TBIT 1 1 Low 
HBPER [53] 1 TRNG + 2 TPER + 1 TXOR + 1 TBIT 1 1 Low 
TENC: encryption, TDEC: decryption, TPRNG: pseudo-random number generator, TRNG: random number generator, TSMUL: 
scalar multiplication, TXOR: XOR, TCH: cryptographic hash, TH: one-way hash function, TCRC: cyclic redundancy check, 
TROT: rotation, TSHIFT: shifting, TITER: iteration, TBIT: bitwise operation, TSPR: spreading, TPER: permutation, TMOD: modulo, 
TVLFSR: variable linear shift register function. 
 
 
54 
We found that most of the recently proposed protocols do not pay close enough attention 
to DoS, MITM, and eavesdropping attacks, while most of the protocols consider the 
system security against replay, impersonate, traceability, and desynchronization attacks. 
Certainly, protocols [35],[15],[16],[20],[31],[50, 53] are strongly resistant to all of the 
major attacks. 
2.2.3 Comparison of Security Requirements 
Security requirements for an RFID system should be satisfied with the system to 
defend against the attacks mentioned in this paper. Table 2.2.3 compares the security 
requirements in each protocol, which includes mutual authentication (SR1), 
confidentiality (SR2), message integrity (SR3), privacy (SR4), forward secrecy (SR5), 
backward secrecy (SR6), tag anonymity (SR7), and conforming to EPC standards (SR8). 
We found that most of the protocols fully considered mutual authentication, privacy, and 
data protection, while backward secrecy is given the least attention, and should be more 
considered in future work. However, Niu et al. [37] and X. Chen [20] completely 
satisfied all of the security requirements in their protocol. 
Since the RFID passive tag has limited resources to compute complex 
operations, the heavyweight and simple-weight protocols are not feasible for practical 
implementation. However, lightweight and ultra-lightweight protocols use only simple 
operations within the tag computation limits and show the lowest tag overhead level. 
Lightweight and ultra-lightweight protocols are considered the most suitable for the 
current applications. Another vital aspect when considering the appropriate RFID 
protocol is the security resistance to the attacks. We found out that Chang et al. [35],  
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Table 2.2.2: Comparison of Various System Requirements 
ST1: replay attack, ST2: man-in-the-middle, ST3: eavesdropping, ST4: impersonate attack, ST5: 
traceability, ST6: desynchronization, ST7: DoS, ST8: other types of attack, Y: satisfied, N: not satisfied. *: 
not applicable 
 
 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST6 ST7 ST8 
SB-A [9] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Cloning 
SB-B [9] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Cloning 
ECU [11] Y Y * Y Y * * * 
SPA [12] N * * N Y * * * 
EMA [6] Y * * N N * * * 
PII [13] Y * * Y Y * * * 
RUND [14] Y * * Y Y Y Y * 
IECC [15] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Cloning 
EECC [16] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Spoofing 
RBAC [18] Y * * Y Y * Y * 
NRS [19] N Y N N N N N * 
NRS+ [8] N Y Y N N N N * 
NRS++ [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y * 
ACSP [21] N N N N N N N Counting 
ACSP+ [22] N * * N Y Y N Counting 
ACSP++ [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Counting 
LAP [23] Y * * N N N Y * 
Flyweight[26] Y Y Y Y Y Y * * 
MASS [28] N N N N Y N * * 
EP-UAP [29] N Y Y N Y * * * 
DRAP [30] Y * * Y Y Y Y Y 
GUPA [31] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y DoP 
FTest [32] Y Y Y Y Y * * Counterfeit +Collision 
ACS [33] Y Y Y Y Y * * Counterfeit +Collision 
HBA [34] N Y Y Y Y Y N Brute + Counterfeit 
HBA+ [35] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Brute for 
VLP [36] Y Y Y * Y Y * * 
OMP [37] N * * Y Y Y Y * 
SEAS [38] Y Y * Y Y Y Y * 
SAP [39] Y * Y Y Y * * * 
STS [5] Y * * Y Y Y Y * 
CWH+ [41] Y * Y Y * Y * Disclosure 
PGX [43] Y Y Y Y N Y * Cloning 
PGM [43] Y Y Y Y N Y * Cloning 
MACC [45] Y Y * Y N Y Y * 
MACD [45] Y Y * Y Y Y Y * 
HBROT [50] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y * 
HBPER [53] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y * 
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Table 2.2.3: Comparison of the Security Requirements 
 SR1 SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR6 SR7 SR8 
SB-A [9] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N 
SB-B [9] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N 
ECU [11] N Y Y Y Y * Y N 
SPA [12] * * * * N * * * 
EMA [6] * * * * N * * * 
PII [13] * * * * N * * * 
RUND [14] Y Y Y Y Y * Y N 
IECC [15] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
EECC [16] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
RBAC [18] Y Y Y Y * * Y N 
NRS [19] N Y N N N N N Y 
NRS+ [8] N Y Y N N N N Y 
NRS++ [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
ACSP [21] Y N N N N N N Y 
ACSP+ [22] Y Y Y * N Y * Y 
ACSP++ [20] Y Y Y Y Y Y * Y 
LAP [23] Y Y Y N Y * N Y 
Flyweight [26] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
MASS [28] Y Y N * Y * * Y 
EP-UAP [29] N Y Y Y * * Y Y 
DRAP [30] Y * * Y * * Y Y 
GUPA [31] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
FTest [32] N Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
ACS [33] Y * * Y * * Y Y 
HBA [34] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
HBA+ [35] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
VLP [36] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
OMP [37] Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SEAS [38] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
SAP [39] Y Y Y * * * * Y 
STS [5] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
CWH+ [41] Y Y Y * Y * * Y 
PGX [43] Y * * N * * N Y 
PGM [43] Y * * N * * N Y 
MACC [45] Y Y Y N Y * N Y 
MACD [45] Y Y Y Y Y * Y Y 
HBROT [50] Y Y Y Y Y * * Y 
HBPER [53] Y Y Y Y Y * * Y 
SR1: mutual authentication, SR2: confidentiality, SR3: message integrity, SR4: privacy, SR5: forward secrecy, SR6: 
backward secrecy, SR7: tag anonymity, SR8: conforming to EPC standard, Y: satisfied, N: not satisfied, *: not 
applicable. 
Farash [15], Zhang and Qi [16], X. Chen et al. [20], Liu et al. [31], Lin and Song [50], 
and Ouaskou et al. [53] protocols successfully resist all of the major attacks. Although 
the other protocols could not resist all of the attacks, they could perform better than the 
fully secure protocols in term of computation cost; examples include the protocols 
presented in Farash [15], Zhang and Qi [16], X. Chen et al. [20], and Liu et al. [31], 
 
 
57 
which have high computation overhead on the tag side. We encourage researchers to pay 
attention to the forward and backward security since most protocols do not reflect on 
these two types of attacks. Finally, maintaining the basic security requirements for an 
RFID system is required to achieve protection against the mentioned attacks in this 
literature. We assess that only the protocols of Niu et al. [37] and X. Chen et al. [20] 
satisfy all of the security requirements to maintain the system in a stable and available 
state. Even though this review shows security variation among the reviewed protocols, 
each one could still be a preference over others, depending on the requirements of the 
application in hand. 
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED SERVERLESS RFID 
AUTHENTICATION MODEL 
3.1 Network Model 
RFID passive tags are distributed in an area of interest and attached to mobile 
objects, i.e. cars. All the tags have the same resources and computational capabilities. The 
passive tag has no power source and gets activated based on the electromagnetic waves 
that are sent from the reader at the beginning of the communication. The RFID reader is a 
scanning device that is either in a fixed position or mobile handheld. It has more 
resources and computational capability than the passive tag. It collects the tag 
information such as the Electronic Product Code (EPC) [3] that is a 96-bit string of data 
contains the tag identity, organization, protocol, product type, and owner. The reader 
reports the scanned information to the database server. The Server is a centralized 
database device with a computer program that delivers, stores and manages all the 
information of the reader and tag. The reader interrogates the tag in the range by sending 
a challenging request signal to start the communication. The tag, on the other hand, 
responds to the reader’s request based on the approved protocol to verify its legitimate 
identity. The reader forwards the tag’s response to the server to search for the correct 
information of the tag in the database. The server supports the reader to authenticate the 
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tag to start a secure channel between the reader and the tag for their further 
communication. In addition, the tag also uses the approved protocol to verify the reader’s 
identity to avoid compromising the secret information or location of the tag. 
3.2 Serverless Model 
The server role is eliminated in the proposed serverless model of RFID. The 
backend server is not available during the communication between the reader and the tag. 
The reader and tag should be able to verify each other and process the authentication 
messages successfully while the server is offline. Since the passive tag is considered a 
low constraint device with scarce resources, the transmitted message between the reader 
and the tag should carry simple operations within the capability of the tag to perform. 
Therefore, we consider the elliptic curve cryptography that can be operated by the passive 
tag to exchange the secret keys. We employed the elliptic curve key agreement based on 
the discrete log problem in Diffie-Hellman algorithm [54] that allows the reader and the 
tag to establish a shared key from their public and private keys through an insecure 
channel to encrypt the transmitted messages. The elliptic curve is a plane curve over a 
finite field that contains points satisfying the following equation: 
𝒚𝟐 = 𝒙𝟑 + 𝒂𝒙 + 𝒃 
(
(1) 
The protocol uses the multiplicative group of integers modulo P, and G as a 
primitive root modulo P, where P is prime. The reader and the tag choose random 
integers a, b respectively as their private keys and compute their public keys as the 
following: 
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𝑨 = 𝑮𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (2) 
𝑩 = 𝑮𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (3) 
The values of A and B are exchanged between the reader and the tag. Then, the 
reader computes the shared secret s using the receiver B, and G, P as the following: 
𝒔 = 𝑩𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (4) 
The tag also computes the shared secret s using the received A, and G, P as the 
following: 
𝒔 = 𝑨𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (5) 
As a result, both the reader and the tag end up calculating the same value as their 
shared secret keys because the modulo rules satisfy the following: 
𝑨𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 = 𝑮𝒂𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 = 𝑮𝒃𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 = 𝑩𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (6) 
which also means: 
(𝑮𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷)𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 = (𝑮𝒃 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷)𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑷 (7) 
Based on the points P and G, the resulted shared secret can take any value 
between 1 and P-1 that satisfies the following condition: 
𝟏 ≤ 𝒔 ≤  𝑷 − 𝟏  
The security of the elliptic curve algorithm lies in the complexity of computing 
the original values of public and private keys to obtain the secret key. 
3.3 Communication Model 
In this section, we present the communication model between the RFID entities. 
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3.3.1 Setup Phase 
This phase handles transferring the necessary data and values from the database 
server to the reader and the tag. The server, the reader, and the tag share by manufacturer: 
the elliptic curve point generator and the server public key. The tag by default stores its 
random identifier that is updated every session to protect the real identity of the tag. The 
setup phase is also considered a renewal phase such that the reader and the tag request 
new values to start a new communication session. The renewal phase is necessary when 
the timestamp expires, or any secret value is compromised to an unauthorized party. 
Table 3.3.1: Protocol Notations 
P Point generator of G 
G An additive group of prime order q on an elliptic curve  
yprv, rprv , tprv Private keys of server, reader, tag 
Ypub, Rpub , Tpub Public keys of server, reader, tag 
Xi Tag identifier 
Tagi tag ID, group ID, Timestamp 
Gkj , Gkjold Current and old values for Group ID 
Listk List of tags share the same group ID 
Unlike the currently available RFID protocols, the setup phase in SLEC protocol 
is assumed to be insecure and functions as the following steps: 
1) The reader and the tag generate random numbers 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1, 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 respectively, where 
𝑟, 𝑡 𝜖𝑍𝑞 , then compute their public key using the private keys and the point 
generator as: 
𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏 = 𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝑷 (8) 
𝑻𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏 = 𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝑷 (9) 
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2) The reader and the tag compute the server secret message of M1, M2 respectively 
using their private keys  𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1, 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 and the stored public key of the server Y as 
the following:  
𝑴𝟏 = 𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝒀 (10) 
𝑴𝟐 = 𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝒀 (11) 
3) The reader and tag send the computed server shared secret M1, M2 to the server, 
then the server obtains the public keys of both reader and tag as: 
𝑹′𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏 = 𝒚
−𝟏 ∗ 𝑴𝟏 (12) 
𝑻′𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏 = 𝒚
−𝟏 ∗ 𝑴𝟐 (13) 
4) The server, in turn, computes the shared secret for each reader and tag for further 
communication with the reader and the tag as the following: 
𝑴′𝟏 = 𝒚𝒑𝒓𝒗 ∗ 𝑹 ==  𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝒀 = 𝑴𝟏 (14) 
𝑴′𝟐 = 𝒚𝒑𝒓𝒗 ∗ 𝑻 ==  𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟏 ∗ 𝒀 = 𝑴𝟐 (15) 
5) The server generates and stores the following information for each tag: 
• Random Xi as tag identifier. 
• Timestamp Ts. 
• Group ID Gk. 
such that Tagi = {Xi, GK, Ts} 
6) The server then generates a list of tags for each reader contains a group of tags that 
share the same group ID.  
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7) Further, the server sends the reader the tag list as M3, and sends the tag its 
information as M4: 
𝑴𝟑 = 𝑳𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒌 + 𝒉( 𝑹
′
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏, 𝑴
′
𝟏) (16) 
𝑴𝟒 = 𝑻𝒂𝒈𝒊 + +𝒉( 𝑻
′
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟏, 𝑴
′
𝟐) (17) 
8) The reader computes and verifies the hash value to obtain the list of tags. The 
tag also validates the hash value to receive the tag information. The server current public 
key is not shared during the communication, so only the legitimate reader and tag that 
have the real server public key will be able to compute and verify the hash value to obtain 
the messages sent by the server 
3.3.2 Authentication Phase 
When the setup phase is completed successfully, each reader will have a list of 
tags that have: tag ID, group ID, a timestamp for each tag, and the tag will have: tag ID, 
group ID, and timestamp. The communication starts with mutual authentication between 
the reader and the tag as the following steps: 
1) The reader generates a random number 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2, where 𝑟 𝜖 𝑍𝑞 then computes its 
public key using the private keys and the point generator as: 
𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 = 𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟐 ∗ 𝑷 (18) 
2) The reader computes the M1, and M2 as the following:  
𝑴𝟏 = 𝒉(𝑮𝒌𝒋) (19) 
𝑴𝟐 = 𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐⨁ 𝑻𝒔 (20) 
Then, the reader sends M1, and M2 to the tag. 
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3) The tag will process four steps: 
- Validate 𝑀1 = ℎ(𝐺𝑘𝑗) to verify the intended group using the current or the 
old value of Gk. Based on the group verification, the tag generates a random 
number 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣2, where 𝑡 𝜖 𝑍𝑞 and computes its public key as: 
𝑻𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 = 𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟐 ∗ 𝑷 (21) 
- Obtain the reader public key from M2 
𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 = (𝑴𝟐 ⨁ 𝑻𝒔) − 𝒀 (22) 
- Compute the secret share key with the reader using the reader obtained public 
key  
𝑴𝟑 = 𝒕𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟐 ∗ 𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 (23) 
- Compute the authentication message M4 and sends it to the reader 
𝑴𝟒 = 𝒉(𝑿𝒊, 𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 , 𝑻𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 , 𝑮𝒌𝒋) (24) 
- Update the values of the tag ID, Gkjold, and Gkj 
𝑿𝒊 = 𝑷𝑹𝑵𝑮(𝑿𝒊) (25) 
𝑮𝒌𝒋
𝒐𝒍𝒅 = 𝑮𝒌𝒋 (26) 
𝑮𝒌𝒋 = 𝑷𝑹𝑵𝑮(𝑮𝒌𝒋) (27) 
4) The reader extracts 𝑇′𝑝𝑢𝑏2 from the received message and verifies the hash value 
of M4 to authenticate the tag 
𝑻′𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 = 𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒗𝟐
−𝟏 ∗ 𝑴𝟑 (28) 
5) The reader computes M5 and sends it to the tag; then, updates the values of the tag 
ID, Gkj,  
𝑴𝟓 = 𝒉(𝑿𝒊, 𝑹𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐 , 𝑻′𝒑𝒖𝒃𝟐) (29) 
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𝑿𝒊 = 𝑷𝑹𝑵𝑮(𝑿𝒊) (25) 
𝑮𝒌𝒋 = 𝑷𝑹𝑵𝑮(𝑮𝒌𝒋) (27) 
6) The tag verifies M5 to authenticate the reader 
3.3.3 Recovery Phase 
In an event where any value of the communication is compromised, the tag or the 
reader can renew the communication values from any server checkpoint during the 
transportation route. The recovery phase is similar to the security setup phase presented 
in this chapter. The tag and reader will exchange their newly generated public keys using 
the server’s public key stored in their memory. This will allow the reader and tag to be 
retrieved back into the network with new values. 
 
 
66 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 4.1 Experiment Design 
In our SLEC protocol, we created an RFID network with a dynamic size that the 
number of readers and tags can be increased or decreased. We included one server, five 
readers, and twenty tags that are placed in objects such as cars. The distance range 
between the tags and readers is initially assumed to be a few meters based on the reading 
range of Electronic Product Code Class1 generation 2 of RFID passive tags [3]. The 
server initializes a database table to store all the readers and tags unique IDs. The readers 
are placed in fixed positions such as poles along the route of the mobile tags. Before the 
car departs the dealership inventory, the setup phase is executed, and all the values are 
stored in the tag and readers. During the tag movement, the reader can scan the tag in the 
car to perform the mutual authentication and thus, obtain the required information of the 
tag. 
4.2 Serverless Authentication Based on Elliptic curve Algorithm 
The proposed protocol is implemented based on the following algorithm: 
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Algorithm 1 SLEC 
Input parameters: minimum value for server_public_key (Y), point generator (P) 
                              tag random identifier (Xi) in server 
Server:  Reader:  Tag:  
Setup: 
 
 
 
 
 
Step2: 
- extract 𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏1 , 𝑇𝑝𝑢𝑏1 from 𝑀1 , 𝑀2 
𝑅′𝑝𝑢𝑏1 = 𝑦
−1 ∗ 𝑀1 
𝑇′𝑝𝑢𝑏1 = 𝑦
−1 ∗ 𝑀2 
- generate 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖 : [𝑋𝑖 , 𝑇𝑠, 𝐺𝑘𝑗] 
- create 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑘 : [𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖, . . , 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑛 
      𝑀3 = 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +
ℎ(𝑅′𝑝𝑢𝑏1, 𝑀1) 
      𝑀4 = 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖 + ℎ(𝑇
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏1, 𝑀2) 
- send 𝑀3 to reader → 
- send 𝑀4 to tag → 
Step1: 
- select random 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 𝜖𝑍𝑞 
- 𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏1 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 ∗ 𝑃 
- 𝑀1 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 ∗ 𝑌 
 
- Forward 𝑀1 , 𝑀2 to server  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step3: 
- verify the hash value and extract 
𝑇𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝑀3 − ℎ(𝑅
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏1, 𝑀1) 
 
- select random 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 𝜖𝑍𝑞 
- 𝑇𝑝𝑢𝑏1 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 ∗ 𝑃 
- 𝑀2 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 ∗ 𝑌 
- Send 𝑀2 to reader  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶  
 
 
- verify the hash value and extract 
𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖 = 𝑀4 − ℎ(𝑇
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏1, 𝑀2) 
Authentication Phase: 
 
Step1: 
- select random 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2 𝜖𝑍𝑞 
- 𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏2 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2 ∗ 𝑃 
- 𝑀1 = ℎ(𝐺𝑘𝑗) 
- 𝑀2 = 𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏2 ⨁ 𝑇𝑠 
- send 𝑀1 , 𝑀2 to tag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step3: 
- Extract  𝑇′𝑝𝑢𝑏2 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2
−1 ∗ 𝑀3 
- Validate 𝑀4 to authenticate tag 
- 𝑀5 = ℎ(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑅𝑝𝑢𝑏2 , 𝑇′𝑝𝑢𝑏2) 
- Send 𝑀5 to tag → 
- Update: 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝑋𝑖) 
𝐺𝑘𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝐺𝑘𝑗) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step2: 
- Validate 𝑀1 to verify the group 
- select random 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣2 𝜖𝑍𝑞 
- 𝑇𝑝𝑢𝑏2 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣2 ∗ 𝑃 
- extract 𝑅′𝑝𝑢𝑏2 = 𝑀2⨁ 𝑇𝑠 
- 𝑀3 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣2 ∗ 𝑅
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏2  
- 𝑀4 = ℎ(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑅
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏2 , 𝑇𝑝𝑢𝑏2 , 𝐺𝑘𝑗) 
- Send 𝑀3 ,𝑀4 to reader  
- Update: 
          𝑋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝑋𝑖) 
         𝐺𝑘𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝐺𝑘𝑗 
         𝐺𝑘𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝐺𝑘𝑗) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step4: 
- Validate 𝑀5 to authenticate reader 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 In this section, we present the system performance and security analysis of the 
protocol SLEC. We also compare the SLEC protocol to other serverless protocols. The 
security of SLEC mainly depends on the public key of the main server, which is securely 
disseminated to all readers and tags. Further, the setup and authentication phases can then 
be executed through an insecure network to maintain the system requirements and defend 
the security threats. 
5.1 Analysis of System Requirements 
The SLEC protocol maintains the system requirements that are necessary to create 
a secure and reliable RFID system such as mutual authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, privacy, forward secrecy, anonymity, and availability. 
1) Mutual Authentication 
The protocol allows both the reader and the tag to perform a mutual 
authentication since only the legitimate tag can extract the public key of the reader from 
the message M2. Besides, only the legitimate reader can calculate the hash value in the 
message M5 to prove its identity to the tag. As a result, mutual authentication is satisfied. 
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2) Privacy and Confidentiality 
The transmitted message is confidential because the authentication messages are 
secured by a hash value that can only be computed by an authorized entity using their 
secret keys. The privacy of the tag is satisfied as the secret information is protected and 
not transmitted in the clear. 
3) Message Integrity 
The message integrity factor is also satisfied because the messages are combined 
with a digital signature of the sender. 
4) Forward and Backward Secrecy 
The reader and the tag generate new secret values in every authentication session 
to avoid tracking or obtaining any secret values from any successful authentication 
session. Thus, an adversary cannot perform a successful authentication from any previous 
or expired sessions or anticipate the following authentication messages. 
5) Anonymity 
The EPC of the tag is not used in the protocol, but only the tag random identifier 
that is updated every session. As a result, the private information stored in the tag is kept 
secret. 
6) Availability 
The protocol provides a recovery mechanism to maintain system availability. In 
an event where any tag or any secret value of the communication is compromised, the 
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system can recover the tag by sending new values to the tag during the recovery phase to 
perform a new authentication session as long as the public key of the server remains 
secret. Otherwise, a new setup phase is required to feed the tag with a new public key for 
the server. 
7) Scalability 
We introduce the concept of tag grouping in SLEC. We combine a number of tags 
into a group that shares the same group ID with all the tags, but each tag in the group has 
a unique tag ID. This mechanism allows the system to reduce the communication signals 
that are transmitted in the network since only the tags with the same group ID will 
respond to the reader’s request. Moreover, the grouping mechanism reduces the 
computation overhead on the reader side when identifying a tag from a large number of 
tags. As a result, the protocol is scalable by maintaining a consistent operation overhead 
on both sides of the reader and the tag. 
Table 5.1 demonstrates the comparison of the system requirements that are 
satisfied in our SLEC protocol, SAP protocol proposed by Mtita et al. [39], and STS 
protocol proposed by Sundaresan et al. [5]. 
5.2 Analysis of Security Requirements 
The protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman digital signature algorithm using a 
256-bit key, which is equivalent to the RSA algorithm with a 3072-bit key that is longer 
than the commonly used key of 2048 [55]. This gives a higher level of security to SLEC 
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algorithm. Therefore, the protocol is secure against different security attacks that most of 
the RFID protocols can experience. 
Table 5.1. Comparison of the System Requirements 
System Requirement SAP STS SLEC 
Mutual Authentication Y Y Y 
Privacy and Confidentiality N Y Y 
Message Integrity Y Y Y 
Forward and Backward Secrecy N N Y 
Anonymity * Y Y 
Availability N N Y 
Scalability N N Y 
Y: satisfied                                 N: not satisfied                              *: Not applicable 
1) Replay Attach Resistance 
The proposed SLEC protocol is secure against replay attack since the 
authentication session involves timestamps and freshly generated random values as 
private keys for both reader and tag. If an adversary eavesdrops on the communication 
channel to replay the tag response, he will not be able to extract any message from the 
reader or the tag, and the timestamp will not match the current session. 
Lemma: SLEC is secure against replay attack 
Proof: 
Adversary replays old session1 to the reader: 
 𝑀3 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) 
 𝑀4 = ℎ(𝑋1 + (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + (𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + 𝐺𝑘1) 
 Reader verifies in session2:  
 𝑇′𝑝𝑢𝑏2 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2
−1 × [𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃)] 
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𝑀′4 = ℎ(𝑋2 + (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2 × 𝑃) + [𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣2
−1 × 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃)] + 𝐺𝑘2) 
 Verification fails since 𝑀′4 ≠ 𝑀4. Unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
2) Man-In-The-Middle Attack Resistance 
If an adversary interrupts the message transmitted by a reader or a tag, modifies it 
and sends it back as a real message, the message will not be extracted by any entity. 
Therefore, the communication will be terminated if no response is sent because all the 
messages transmitted in the authentication session involve validating the values before 
extracting any data from them. Therefore, SLEC protocol is resistant to MIM attack. 
Lemma: SLEC is secure against modification 
Proof: 
Adversary A intercept message 3 and 4 and modifies the tag information by A:  
 𝑀3 = 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) 
 𝑀4 = ℎ(𝑋𝑎 + (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + (𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + 𝐺𝑘𝑎) 
 Reader verifies in session2:  
 𝐴′𝑝𝑢𝑏1 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1
−1 × [𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃)] 
𝑀′4 = ℎ(𝑋1 + (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + [𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1
−1 × 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃)] + 𝐺𝑘1) 
 Verification fails since 𝑀′4 ≠ 𝑀4 because the tag ID and group key used 
in the message sent by A are not the same in the reader list for the requested tag. 
Unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
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3) Traceability Attack Resistance 
An adversary can trace the signals sent by a specific tag to identify the tag 
location. However, the reader in SLEC protocol broadcasts the message signals to a group 
of tags that respond to the reader for the same message request. This results in sending 
different signals from different locations to confuse the adversary from tracking a certain 
tag to obtain its location. Accordingly, the protocol is resistant to tracing. 
Lemma: SLEC is secure against the tracing attack 
Proof: 
To distinguish the difference between two tags T1 and T2, an adversary has to 
construct the correct hash value with correct tag id (X), timestamp (Ts), and a group key 
(Gk) which are only transmitted during the setup phase: 
 𝑀4 = 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖 + ℎ[(𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + (𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑦 × 𝑃))] 
 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑖 = 𝑀4 − ℎ[(𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × 𝑃) + (𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑣1 × (𝑦 × 𝑃))] 
The adversary has to solve the correct elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
(ECDLP) to obtain the secret values in Tagi that are used in the communication. 
4) Impersonate Attack Resistance 
It is unlikely for any adversary to impersonate the reader or the tag in our protocol 
since they used a shared point generator algorithm P that is only known to the legitimate 
server, reader, and tag. So, it is impossible for the adversary to compute the required 
messages to pass the authentication. 
Lemma: SLEC is secure against impersonation 
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Proof: 
Reader: 𝑀1 = ℎ(𝐺𝑘) 
 𝑀2 = (𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑃)⨁ 𝑇𝑠 
 Adversary:  𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 ,  𝐴𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑃 
  𝑀3𝑎 = 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × (𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑃) 
  𝑀4𝑎 = ℎ(𝑋𝑎 + (𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑃) +  𝐴𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝐺𝑘𝑎) 
 Reader:  𝐴′𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑣
−1 × [𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑣 × 𝑃)] 
  𝑀4 = ℎ(𝑋 + 𝑅
′
𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝐴𝑝𝑢𝑏 + 𝐺𝑘) 
  Validation fails since 𝑀4 ≠ 𝑀4𝑎 
 Therefore, the unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
5) Desynchronization Attack Resistance 
The tag in SLEC protocol stores the new and previous values of the group 
identifier that is used at the beginning of the authentication phase. This allows the tag to 
authenticate the reader if the previous session was interrupted by an adversary to break 
the synchronization. The communication values are also updated after every successful 
authentication session using the same algorithm and inputs to maintain the 
synchronization state between the network entities. 
6) Denial of Service Attack Resistance 
In our SLEC protocol, the reader and the tag generate their keys separately using 
the same key generation algorithm, so there is no synchronous update of the keys 
between the server and the tag for the attack to occur. 
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Table 5.2 demonstrates the comparison of the security attacks resistance between 
our SLEC protocol, SAP protocol proposed by Mtita et al. [39], and STS protocol 
proposed by Sundaresan et al. [5]. 
Table 5.2 Comparison of the Security Threats Resistance 
Attacks SAP STS SLEC 
Replay Attack Y Y Y 
Man-in-the-Middle * * Y 
Eavesdropping Y * Y 
Impersonate Attack Y Y Y 
Traceability Attack Y Y Y 
Desynchronization * Y Y 
Denial of Service * Y Y 
     Y: Satisfied                               N: Not satisfied                      *: Not applicable 
 
5.3 Analysis of Computation Cost 
Since the passive tag used in the RFID system has limited capabilities and 
resources, it is essential to consider the computation and security features for the 
appropriate application. Even though the elliptic curve has higher computation overhead 
on both the reader and the tag, we provide a higher security level in our SLEC protocol 
that satisfies the resistance to all the security attacks. Moreover, we compare our protocol 
with additional server-based elliptic curve protocols such as IECC protocol proposed by 
Farash [15] and EECC protocol proposed by Zhang and Qi [16] to illustrate a well-
defined measurement for the computation complexity. The comparison shows that there 
is no major additional cost between the previously proposed ECC-based protocols and 
our SLEC protocol, although our protocol is completely serverless in the authentication 
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phase. Table 5.3 demonstrates the operations computed by the tag and the number of 
transmitted messages from the reader and the tag during the authentication phase. 
Table 5.3 Comparison of the Computation Cost on the Tag 
Protocol Operation Tag Reader 
SAP [39] 2TH + 2TRNG 1 2 
STS [5] 7TXOR + 3TPRNG 1 1 
IECC [15] 2TSMUL + 2TH 1 2 
EECC [16] 2TSMUL + TSAD + 2TH 1 2 
SLEC 2TSMUL + 3TH 1 2 
TSMUL: scalar multiplication, TSAD: scalar addition, TH: one-way hash, TXOR: XOR, TPRNG: pseudo-
random number generation 
. 
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CHAPTER 6: FORMAL VERIFICATION 
 The formal verification of the protocol is done to prove the correctness of the algorithms 
used in the protocol in terms of security and authentication. ProVerif tool [56] is one of the 
powerful tools to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols. It is an automatic cryptographic 
protocol verifier that is developed by Bruno Blanchet to validate the security and authentication 
properties of the cryptographic algorithms in formal models. 
In this section, we use the ProVerif tool to validate reachability and secrecy (security), 
and correspondence assertion (authentication) of SLEC protocol. The results of the verification 
process are also presented. 
6.1 Adversary Model 
The ProVerif tool is based on a model where the adversary can intercept, alter, 
and inject the messages into an insecure network. In SLEC protocol, the adversary has 
initial knowledge of the finite set of parameters that increase during the protocol 
execution in parallel with the adversary. No matter how the adversary interacts with the 
protocol, ProVerif verifies the secrecy of the messages and values transmitted between 
the server, the reader, and the tag. Therefore, the secret messages will never be a part of 
the adversary knowledge to run the protocol successfully. The results of the ProVerif 
verification in this section show that the protocol preserves the secrecy of the messages 
and values that intercepting or altering the message will lead to the protocol termination. 
 
 
78 
6.2 Reachability and Secrecy 
Reachability and secrecy in ProVerif analyze the security properties of the 
protocol against any attacker. We investigate the reachability of a term x by an adversary 
A, so we assess the secrecy of x concerning the modeled protocol. In SLEC protocol, we 
use ProVerif to test whether the secret messages in the setup phase “Ms”, and the secret 
messages in the authentication phase “Ma” are not available to an adversary A. We 
represent the messages transmitted in the setup phase from the server, the reader, and the 
tag as “Mss”, “Msr” and “Mst” respectively. Moreover, we represent the messages 
transmitted in the authentication phase from the reader and the tag as “Mar” and “Mat” 
respectively. The complete verification process is demonstrated in Figure 6.2. The results 
of the verification process conclude, “RESULT, not attacker(Mst1[]) is true” which 
means the setup phase message M1 from the tag is unreachable, and an attack cannot be 
conducted against the protocol successfully. Similarly, “RESULT not attacker(Mar1[]) is 
true” means the authentication phase message M1 from the reader is unreachable and 
secure against the attacks. All setup phase and authentication phase messages are tested 
and resulted in true reachability and secrecy proof. 
Reachability and Secrecy 
Process: 
{1}new p: P; 
{2}new y_22: Y; 
{3}new tprv1: pu_pr_key; 
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{4}new rprv1: pu_pr_key; 
{5}new xi: TagID; 
{6}new Gxi: GK; 
( 
    {7}! 
    {8}let Tpub1: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,tprv1) in 
    {9}let Mst1_23: pu_pr_key = setPhase_encrypt(tprv1,y_22) in 
    {10}out(ch, Mst1_23); 
    {11}in(ch, Mss4': Tag_and_Hash); 
    {12}let tag': Tag = verify_tag(Mss4',h(Tpub1,Mst1_23)) in 
    {13}in(ch, ms1: xored_key); 
    {14}let Ms1': GK = validate_Ms1(ms1) in 
    {15}new ggkk: GK; 
    {16}if (Ms1' = ggkk) then 
    {17}new tprv2: pu_pr_key; 
    {18}let Tpub2: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,tprv2) in 
    {19}in(ch, ms2: pu_pr_key); 
    {20}new ts2': timeStampes; 
    {21}let Rpub2': pu_pr_key = xor(ms2,ts2') in 
    [29]let Mat3_24: pu_pr_key = authen_phase_encrypt(tprv2,Rpub2') in 
    {23}out(ch, Mat3_24); 
    {24}new xi_25: TagID; 
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    {25}let Mat4_26: Hashing = h_ph2_2(xi_25,Rpub2',Tpub1,Ms1') in 
    {26}out(ch, Mat4_26); 
    {27}let xxi: TagID = PRNG(xi_25) in 
    {28}let GKi: GK = PRNG_Group(ggkk) in 
    {29}in(ch, Mar5': Hashing); 
    {30}let Mar55: Hashing = h_ph2_3(xi_25,Tpub2,Rpub2') in 
    {31}if (Mar55 = Mar5') then 
    0 
) | ( 
    {32}! 
    {33}let Rpub1: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,rprv1) in 
    {34}let Msr2_27: pu_pr_key = setPhase_encrypt(rprv1,y_22) in 
    {35}out(ch, Msr2_27); 
    {36}in(ch, Mss3': TagList_and_Hash); 
    {37}let taglisht': TageList = verify_tagList(Mss3',h(Rpub1,Msr2_27)) in 
    {38}new rprv2: pu_pr_key; 
    {39}let Rpub2: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,rprv2) in 
    {40}new GKii: GK; 
    {41}let Mar1_28: hash_GK = h_ph2_(GKii) in 
    {42}out(ch, Mar1_28); 
    {43}new ts2: timeStampes; 
    {44}let Mar2_29: pu_pr_key = xor(Rpub2,ts2) in 
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    {45}out(ch, Mar2_29); 
    {46}in(ch, Mat3': pu_pr_key); 
    {47}let Tpub2': pu_pr_key = authen_phase_dencrypt(Mat3',re_pu_pr_key(rprv2)) in 
    {48}in(ch, Mat4': Hashing); 
    {49}new xii': TagID; 
    {50}let Mar5: Hashing = h_ph2_3(xii',Rpub2,Tpub2') in 
    {51}out(ch, Mar5) 
) | ( 
    {52}! 
    {53}in(ch, (Mst1': pu_pr_key,Msr1': pu_pr_key)); 
    {54}let Tprv1': pu_pr_key = setPhase_decrypt(Mst1',getYinv(y_22)) in 
    {55}let Rprv1': pu_pr_key = setPhase_decrypt(Msr1',getYinv(y_22)) in 
    {56}new ts: timeStampes; 
    {57}let tagi: Tag = create_tag(xi,ts,Gxi) in 
    {58}let tagListi: TageList = create_taglist(tagi) in 
    {59}let Mss3_30: TagList_and_Hash = prepare_tagList(tagListi,h(Rprv1',Msr1')) in 
    {60}out(ch, Mss3_30); 
    {61}let Mss4_31: Tag_and_Hash = prepare_tag(tagi,h(Tprv1',Mst1')) in 
    {62}out(ch, Mss4_31) 
) 
-- Query not attacker(Mst1[]) 
Completing... 
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Starting query not attacker(Mst1[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mst1[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Msr2[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Msr2[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Msr2[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mss3[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mss3[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mss3[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mss4[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mss4[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mss4[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mar1[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mar1[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mar1[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mar2[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mar2[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mar2[]) is true. 
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-- Query not attacker(Mat3[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mat3[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mat3[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mat4[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mat4[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mat4[]) is true. 
Figure 6.2: Verification results of reachability and secrecy 
6.3 Correspondence Assertion 
The correspondence assertion in ProVerif is to model the authentication of the 
protocol using a sequence of events. We apply a sequence of events to verify the 
authentication of the reader to the tag and the authentication of the tag to the reader 
through the encrypted messages individually. The complete verification process of 
authentication is presented in Figure 6.2. The results of the correspondence assertion 
verification show “RESULT inj-event(termReader(x)) ==> inj-event(acceptsReader(x)) 
is true” which means the reader is authenticated by the tag, and “RESULT inj-
event(termTag(x_24)) ==> inj-event(acceptsTag(x_24)) is true” which means the tag is 
authenticated by the reader. The verification results confirm that SLEC protocol achieves 
a successful mutual authentication between the reader and the tag. 
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Correspondence Assertion 
Process: 
{1}new p: P; 
{2}new y_22: Y; 
{3}new tprv1: pu_pr_key; 
{4}new rprv1: pu_pr_key; 
{5}new xi: TagID; 
{6}new Gxi: GK; 
( 
    {7}! 
    {8}let Tpub1: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,tprv1) in 
    {9}let Mst1: pu_pr_key = setPhase_encrypt(tprv1,y_22) in 
    {10}out(ch, Mst1); 
    {11}in(ch, Mss4': Tag_and_Hash); 
    {12}let tag': Tag = verify_tag(Mss4',h(Tpub1,Mst1)) in 
    {13}in(ch, ms1: xored_key); 
    {14}let Ms1': GK = validate_Ms1(ms1) in 
    {15}new ggkk: GK; 
    {16}if (Ms1' = ggkk) then 
    {17}new tprv2: pu_pr_key; 
    {18}let Tpub2: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,tprv2) in 
    {19}in(ch, ms2: pu_pr_key); 
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    {20}new ts2': timeStampes; 
    {21}let Rpub2': pu_pr_key = xor(ms2,ts2') in 
    {22}let Mat3: pu_pr_key = authen_phase_encrypt(tprv2,Rpub2') in 
    {23}out(ch, Mat3); 
    {24}new xi_23: TagID; 
    [29]let Mat4: Hashing = h_ph2_2(xi_23,Rpub2',Tpub1,Ms1') in 
    {26}out(ch, Mat4); 
    {27}let xxi: TagID = PRNG(xi_23) in 
    {28}let GKi: GK = PRNG_Group(ggkk) in 
    {29}in(ch, Mar5': Hashing); 
    {30}let Mar55: Hashing = h_ph2_3(xi_23,Tpub2,Rpub2') in 
    {31}if (Mar55 = Mar5') then 
    {32}event acceptsReader(Mar55); 
    {33}event termReader(Mar55) 
) | ( 
    {34}! 
    {35}let Rpub1: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,rprv1) in 
    {36}let Msr2: pu_pr_key = setPhase_encrypt(rprv1,y_22) in 
    {37}out(ch, Msr2); 
    {38}in(ch, Mss3': TagList_and_Hash); 
    {39}let taglisht': TageList = verify_tagList(Mss3',h(Rpub1,Msr2)) in 
    {40}new rprv2: pu_pr_key; 
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    {41}let Rpub2: pu_pr_key = find_R_and_Tpubs(p,rprv2) in 
    {42}new GKii: GK; 
    {43}let Mar1: hash_GK = h_ph2_(GKii) in 
    {44}out(ch, Mar1); 
    {45}new ts2: timeStampes; 
    {46}let Mar2: pu_pr_key = xor(Rpub2,ts2) in 
    {47}out(ch, Mar2); 
    {48}in(ch, Mat3': pu_pr_key); 
    {49}let Tpub2': pu_pr_key = authen_phase_dencrypt(Mat3',re_pu_pr_key(rprv2)) in 
    {50}in(ch, Mat4': Hashing); 
    {51}new xii': TagID; 
    {52}let Mar5: Hashing = h_ph2_3(xii',Rpub2,Tpub2') in 
    {53}event acceptsTag(Mar5); 
    {54}out(ch, Mar5); 
    {55}event termTag(Mar5) 
) | ( 
    {56}! 
    {57}in(ch, (Mst1': pu_pr_key,Msr1': pu_pr_key)); 
    {58}let Tprv1': pu_pr_key = setPhase_decrypt(Mst1',getYinv(y_22)) in 
    {59}let Rprv1': pu_pr_key = setPhase_decrypt(Msr1',getYinv(y_22)) in 
    {60}new ts: timeStampes; 
    {61}let tagi: Tag = create_tag(xi,ts,Gxi) in 
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    {62}let tagListi: TageList = create_taglist(tagi) in 
    {63}let Mss3: TagList_and_Hash = prepare_tagList(tagListi,h(Rprv1',Msr1')) in 
    {64}out(ch, Mss3); 
    {65}let Mss4: Tag_and_Hash = prepare_tag(tagi,h(Tprv1',Mst1')) in 
    {66}out(ch, Mss4) 
) 
-- Query inj-event(termReader(x)) ==> inj-event(acceptsReader(x)) 
Completing... 
Starting query inj-event(termReader(x)) ==> inj-event(acceptsReader(x)) 
RESULT inj-event(termReader(x)) ==> inj-event(acceptsReader(x)) is true. 
-- Query inj-event(termTag(x_24)) ==> inj-event(acceptsTag(x_24)) 
Completing... 
Starting query inj-event(termTag(x_24)) ==> inj-event(acceptsTag(x_24)) 
RESULT inj-event(termTag(x_24)) ==> inj-event(acceptsTag(x_24)) is true. 
Figure 6.3: Verification results of correspondence assertions 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
RFID is the new alternative to physical barcoding, which is being widely used in the 
fields of product authentication and database storage. Serverless RFID protocols are being 
developed to provide a dynamic network that the mobile tags can be searched and identified in 
different locations away from the server. As RFID network carries along with sensitive 
information, and passive tags have limited resources, many security algorithms have been 
deduced and implemented at a minimal cost using simple operations that are still vulnerable to 
security attacks. We propose a secure serverless RFID protocol (SLEC) that uses the elliptic curve 
cryptography based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The algorithm used is classified as a public 
key algorithm that can be handled by low constraint devices such as RFID passive tags. SLEC 
protocol is considered to be secure against different security attacks that simple protocols suffer 
from. The reader in SLEC protocol is completely capable of identifying and authenticating mobile 
tags under an offline server. We also introduced the tag grouping mechanism to reduce the 
computation overhead on the reader side that is elevated from the scalar operations in the elliptic 
curve computation when identifying a tag in a large-scale network, and also to create a scalable 
system that is not affected by the tag population size. Also, SLEC protocol has a recovery 
mechanism that any compromised values can soon be renewed by any server in the network to 
retrieve the tag and protocol privacy. The protocol is tested using ProVerif cryptographic 
verification tool to prove that SLEC achieves successful security and authentication. We believe 
that the widespread implementation of serverless RFID systems will improve the efficiency of all 
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businesses and processes. This will take RFID technology into the upper level by driving the 
world to go smart. 
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